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Check, Pleas: Toward a Jurisprudence of
Defense Ethics in Plea Bargaining
by HADAR AVIRAM, DEANNA DYER and S. C. THOMAS*
Introduction
The prevalence of plea bargaining has become a clich6 in
literature about the criminal process; almost every law review article
addressing plea bargains begins with a paragraph detailing the decline
of trial rates and the criminal justice system's increasing reliance on
plea bargaining.' Moreover, the prevailing attitude is that plea
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1. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-based
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2008) (recognizing that "[u]pwards of 95% of all
state and federal felony convictions are obtained by guilty plea"); Edward L. Wilkinson,
Ethical Plea Bargaining Under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 39
ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 718 (2008) (noting that "95% of felony criminal cases nationwide are
resolved by plea bargain," then primarily discussing regulation of prosecutorial conduct);
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What's Discovery Got to Do with It?,
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2008, at 28, 29, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publishing/criminaljustice section-newsletter/crimjustcjmag_23_3_yaroshefsky.authche
ckdam.pdf (finding that "[m]ore than 90 percent of cases nationwide result in guilty
pleas." Yaroshefsky discusses United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), which held that a
defendant does not have the right to disclosure of information regarding either
impeachment or an affirmative defense during the pre-guilty plea stage, and argues that
"Brady disclosures prior to entry of a guilty plea would improve the reliability and
accountability of the criminal justice process." Id.).
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bargains are a "necessary evil" in the criminal justice system.2 Aside
from an article published in 1975 based on research "conducted
during the 1907-1908 academic year,"' it is rare for a law review
article to negate the realistic necessity of plea bargains in the modern
criminal justice system.
That plea bargains are necessary has not made them less evil in
the eyes of criminal procedure scholars. Indeed, scholarship often
highlights the negative implications of plea bargaining. These
implications include the risk of pressuring innocent defendants to
plead guilty and the prosecution's discretion to provide inconsistent
offers.' Scholars also criticize the role of plea bargaining in
reinforcing bias against defendants and in the declining trial rate.'
Scholars lament that overburdened public defenders may feel
pressure to dispose of cases quickly through plea bargains, thereby
exacerbating the disproportionality of conviction rates between
indigent defendants and those that can afford private counsel.' To
address many of these systemic flaws would require broad social
reforms to balance against the effects of race and class on the justice
system. The administrative structure of criminal justice, too,
provides prosecutors with abundant discretion, adding to the power
imbalance between prosecution and defense in plea bargaining.
However, one aspect of the practice of plea bargaining that has been
relatively amenable to review and change has been the behavior of
defense attorneys in the plea-bargaining process.
2. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In the
United States, we have plea bargaining a-plenty, but until today it has been regarded as a
necessary evil.").
3. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE
L.J. 1179, 1181 (1975) (arguing that the plea-bargaining system is an inherently irrational
method of administering justice).
4. See, e.g., Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really "Ban" Plea
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753,767-72 (1998).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from A Legal Ethics
Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1192-93 (2003). Green argues that prosecutors have the
ethical duty to respond to the systematic neglect of indigent clients by calling public
attention to the lack of resources for indigent defense and excessive public defender
workloads, and by encouraging the legislature to take steps, including the appropriation of
sufficient funds, to address the problem. Id.
8. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Comment, Honesty and Opacity in Charge
Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1410 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Edward L. Wilkinson, Ethical Plea Bargaining Under the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 39 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 770-779 (2008).
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In two recent cases, Lafler v. Cooper"o and Missouri v. Frye," the
Supreme Court assessed the quality of defense counsel in the context
of plea bargaining and the implications for the defendants' habeas
appeals based on claims of unprofessional conduct by defense
counsel. Writing for the dissent in Lafler, Justice Antonin Scalia
complained:
Today, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States elevates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to
a constitutional entitlement. . . . The court today
embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal law,
in which the State functions like a conscientious
casino-operator, giving each player a fair chance to
beat the house, that is, to serve less time than the law
says he deserves. And when a player is excluded from
the tables, his constitutional rights have been violated.
I do not subscribe to that theory. No one should, least
of all the Justices of the Supreme Court.12
This Article takes a somewhat more pragmatic approach than
Justice Scalia's. As we argue here, not only has the "conscientious
casino operator" operated freely to the point that "sporting-chance"
is the rule rather than the exception, but various institutions,
primarily the bar and the courts, have been developing guidelines for
defense attorneys in the plea-bargaining context. However, these
rules and guidelines can only cover some parts of the practice, and
leave much of the details of plea bargaining to defense expertise and
to trial and error. Relying on a solid body of research developed by
lower-court ethnographers since the 1960s, we map the set of
pressures on the defense attorney in a plea-bargaining scenario. We
examine which of these pressures the legal profession can overcome,
using legislative, judicial, and ethical tools, and which pressures only
the use of "best practices" may control, but not eliminate. We also
provide advice to defense attorneys about acquiring the appropriate
professional expertise to navigate ethically through the unchartered
waters of the plea-bargaining ocean.
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to defense practice
in the context of plea bargaining. Relying on classic courtroom
10. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
11. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
12. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (2012).
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ethnography, we outline the main issues that influence defense
choices and practices, as well as the pressures and temptations to push
clients toward a guilty plea. Parts II and III examine the ways in
which the system oversees and regulates defense performance in plea
bargains, addressing the duties toward the client, the prosecution, and
the court. Part II addresses how the courts have acted to enforce
standards of conduct for defense attorneys at the plea-bargaining
stage, via their rulings in ineffective assistance of counsel claims
(Strickland v. Washington and its progeny). Part III addresses the
ways the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct have spoken to this
issue. Part IV examines the areas that legal and ethical regulation has
not been able to regulate: defense assessment of the "value of the
case;" the management of client hopes; and the defense's role in the
procurement of inconsistent pleas. We conclude by making
suggestions for "best practices" and training tools in these difficult-to-
regulate areas.
I. Defense Attorneys and Plea Bargaining:
An Ethnographic Approach
A. The Crime Control Model, Guilty Pleas, and the Marginality of
Defense Counsel
In his 1968 book, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Herbert
Packer presented and contrasted two theoretical models of the
criminal process: the crime control model, focusing on efficiency and
case processing, and the due process model, focusing on avoiding
wrongful convictions." The models, according to Packer, were two
ends of a spectrum, along which criminal justice systems could be
located and understood.14 The main assumption behind the crime
control model was that the most efficient way to process a large
number of cases through the system was to establish, in the early
stages of the process, whether the defendant was guilty." The
mechanism best suited for such a determination was the police
investigation, which was more direct and less cumbersome than the
criminal trial." Therefore, once a case passed through the filters of
police investigation and the prosecutorial charging decision, the
system could presume, statistically, that the defendant was likely
13. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 163 (1968).
14. Id. at 153.
15. Id. at 162.
16. Id. at 189.
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guilty and, therefore, rely on a streamlined and simplified trial
process that consisted mostly of pleas. 7 By contrast, the due process
model was highly suspicious of the biases inherent to police
investigation and, therefore, valued constitutional protections and
bright-line rules, which provided useful checks on police and
prosecutorial abuse of power."
Two ideas are important to note for our purposes. First, while
the due process model extols the virtues of the adversarial trial as the
ultimate guarantee for truth finding and protection from abuse, the
crime control model sees the plea bargain-not the trial-as the
quintessential method of disposition of criminal charges. 9 Second,
each model -highlights the importance of different players. The
defense attorney is a key player in the due process model, in that s/he
challenges the process to ensure that the actors in that process respect
and preserve the defendant's rights.20 However, s/he is less central in
Packer's articulation of the crime control model, where swift case
processing relies principally on effective and powerful police work
and prosecutorial discretion.2 1
Reviewers have described the two models as "ideal types,"
presented for their power to explain and to assess the priorities of
existing criminal justice systems.22 As we argue elsewhere, Packer was
writing to a generation of criminal justice scholars who witnessed the
Warren Court's revolutionary incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states, and tried to theorize this transformation as a shift
away from crime control to due process. 3 While doctrinal legal
scholars showered the book with praise,24 social scientists and law-
and-society types raised concerns in their critiques." One social
science perspective is particularly pertinent to our inquiry: Malcolm
17. Id. at 221-25.
18. Id. at 165.
19. Id. at 222.
20. Id. at 172.
21. Id.
22. Stuart MacDonald, Constructing a Framework for Criminal Justice Research:
Learning from Packer's Mistakes, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 257, 289 (2008).
23. Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process
Model, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237, 238 (2011). Packer himself was disillusioned with
this idea. Id. at 238, 257.
24. See, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz, Book Review, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1277 (1969).
25. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Toward A New Paradigm Of Criminal Justice: How
The Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control And Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV.
133 (2009).
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Feeley, who at the time was an emerging voice in criminal courtroom
research, argued that the models were not made of the same
conceptual cloth.26 While Packer presented the two models as "ideal
types," Feeley argued that, actually, Due Process was a constitutional
aspiration, an imperative of how things "should" be, whereas crime
control was a descriptive model of how things actually were.27 Albert
Alschuler's review also highlighted this perspective: While the
Supreme Court spoke of Miranda, Gideon, Douglas, and Mapp, in
lower courts it was business as usual, with plea bargaining as the rule
and trial as the exception.
This ethnographic bitterness was well-founded. Since the 1960s,
political scientists, sociologists, and law-and-society scholars had been
studying lower courts and documenting the everyday practices of plea
bargaining. Their findings, unfamiliar perhaps to the doctrinal
criminal procedure scholars of the time who focused on Supreme
Court cases, did not relegate plea bargains to the realm of the obscure
and unrecognized. Instead, they looked at plea bargains as the
natural consequence of an adversarial system and the main avenue by
which courts disposed of cases in the system.2 9 While Packer's models
regarded the role of defense counsel as important in trial work, and
largely ignored defense counsel's role in a model consisting of plea
bargaining, this ethnographic research uncovered the many important
ways in which defense practices and ethics influenced the
procurement of guilty pleas."
B. Revealing Defense Counsel's Function in Plea Bargaining
As we explain below, classic courtroom ethnography revealed
that trials were far from the only setting where defense skills and
expertise mattered in the criminal process. In fact, the art of
procuring a guilty plea required a high degree of experience and skill,
and defense attorneys played a pivotal role in bringing about guilty
pleas. Procuring a guilty plea required not only acquaintance with the
universe of criminal cases and the "going rates," but also special
26. Malcolm M. Feeley, Two Models of Criminal Justice System: An Organizational
Perspective, 7 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 407, 414-15 (1973).
27. Id. at 409-11, 417-18.
28. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981).
29. Feeley, supra note 26, at 416-19. See also Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining
and the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338 (1982).
30. Feeley, supra note 26, at 417-19.
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communication skills for addressing both the clients and the
prosecutors.31 The scholarly approach toward these skills was highly
cynical in the 1960s. However, scholars gradually gained a more
nuanced understanding of the larger systemic and procedural forces
that produced plea bargaining.32
i. 1960s-1970s: "You Get What You Pay For"
The early era of courtroom ethnography laid a great deal of
blame for the prevalence of plea bargaining on the shoulders of
defense attorneys, particularly public defenders. The main concern
presented in this era's literature is that the fee structure of attorneys
is largely responsible for the quality of service provided to clients.
Critics reasoned that public defenders, who do not receive their pay
directly from the clients, typically prioritize the interests of the system
that supports their existence, where they repeatedly encounter
prosecutors and judges who value efficiency and speedy case
processing. Therefore, they are co-opted into the system and
collaborate with its objectives by pressuring defendants to plead out
quickly. Private defense attorneys, on the other hand, would plot
their case strategy based on their fee structure. In either case, the
assumption in the literature is that a guilty plea represents a lesser
quality of service than a full criminal trial.
David Sudnow's Normal Crimes, which highlighted the dramatic
difference between the theory and practice of criminal law, was one
of the earliest works to expose not only how defense attorneys
gauged the value of their case, but also how they presented that case
to prosecutors." Sudnow conducted empirical observations of plea
negotiations between district attorneys and public defenders, listening
closely to the way defense attorneys described the cases to their
colleagues. What mattered for plea bargaining negotiations, Sudnow
concluded, was not the legal definition of the offense, but rather the
31. See generally David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal
Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBs. 255 (1965).
32. Of course, some of this has to do with the possible objective improvement of
defense quality, but that is difficult to measure. Debra Emmelman's writing inspires this
analysis. See generally, e.g., Debra S. Emmelman, Past Present and Future: Research into
Advocacy for Criminal Defendants, Address at the New Directions in Criminal Courtroom
Research Conference, Tel Aviv University (May 16-17, 2007), http://www.tau.ac.il/law/
events/16-17-05-07/DebraSEmmelman.doc; Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain:
Case Settlement as a Product of Recursive Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 335
(1996).
33. See generally Sudnow, supra note 31.
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real-world pattern according to which it was committed.' Defense
attorneys developed an expertise in classifying and describing their
cases according to these patterns, acknowledging similarities between
groups of cases and conceptualizing them as "normal crimes" of a
particular type.3 For example, a defense attorney negotiating a
burglary case would not argue with the prosecutor over whether the
client had satisfied the breaking and entering element. Rather, the
defense attorney would highlight the features of the burglary that
merited leniency, such as the context of the burglary (for example, a
drug addict stealing cheap electronics to support his/her habit-
similar to many such drug addicts and thus deserving of a similar
penalty as the one imposed in a typical case of that category). When
the prosecutors shared the expertise of seeing many similar cases,
there would also be a shared understanding of the appropriate
disposition of the "normal crime," which would facilitate the
bargain.36 Most cases were "normal crimes," that is, they could be
classified according to these repetitive features, and so their
disposition became simple, leaving only the abnormal, unusual cases
for trials." While Sudnow's writing is objective in tone, the
conclusions of the study imply that defense attorneys are more likely
to pay attention to the few unique cases, while treating all "normal
crimes" in a cursory, abbreviated fashion."
Even more scathing was Abraham Blumberg's The Practice of
Law as a Confidence Game, in which he argued that defense
attorneys pressured and deceived clients into pleading guilty."
Blumberg argued that, in presenting a plea bargain to the client,
defense attorneys tended to highlight the bleak chances at trial and
the attractiveness of the plea, essentially "selling" a bargain to the
34. Id.
35. The practice of superficially classifying criminal cases by type, rather than
analyzing case facts in detail, continues today. Recently, in a New York Times article
about caseloads in public defense, defense attorney Arthur J. Jones "said he wished he
had more time to investigate cases and could go to trial more often, rather than accepting
the police version of events and then, after a short discussion, helping his clients make a
life-altering deal." Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/
09defender.html?pagewanted=all.
36. See generally Sudnow, supra note 31.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Abraham Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Co-optation of a Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 15, 28-29 (1967).
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client against his or her interest." An important aspect of Blumberg's
argument pertained to "fee collection and fixing." 41 Private attorneys,
who depend on fees paid by the client, structure their decisions of
whether to go to trial or to pressure their clients into a plea based on
their estimate of the likelihood and ease of obtaining their fees.42
Blumberg's analysis was far from methodical and he based it mostly
on his observations as a practitioner.43 However, Alschuler's more
rigorous study of defense practices, which was more rigorous, came to
a similar conclusion." Comparing various systems of public and
private defense, Alschuler concluded that any type of fee structure
had inherent biases that steered attorneys away from trials and
toward pressuring their clients to plead guilty.45
While these grim assessments of defense quality in plea
bargaining targeted private and public defense attorneys alike, some
argued that the public defense system was particularly in need of
reform. Anthony Platt and Randi Pollack's 1974 study of public
defenders' careers, consisting of semi-structured interviews, revealed
a great deal of dissatisfaction." Most of the public defenders they
interviewed saw their position as training for private practice, and
those who stayed for more than an average of two and one-half years
did so out of inertia and lack of drive. The ones who left the system
reported feeling "burned out" and embittered.47  This notion that
public defense is merely a fig leaf, constructed more to protect the
system and cover its flaws than to provide indigent clients with quality
representation, was repeated in Gregg Barak's In Defense of the Rich:
The Emergence of the Public Defender." Barak maintained that the
public defender system was a product of market capitalism-it
oppresses the poor, and it maintains class interests by providing
indigent defendants with flawed representation while allowing the
rich to circumvent the low standards of justice in their ability to
40. Id. at 29.
41. Id. at 24-29.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 18.
44. See Alschuler, supra note 28, at 716-23.
45. Id. at 721.
46. Anthony Platt & Randi Pollock, Channeling Lawyers: The Careers of Public
Defenders, 9 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 1(1974).
47. Debra S. Emmelman, Past Present and Future: Research into Advocacy for
Criminal Defendants, supra note 32, at 2.
48. Gregg Barak, In Defense of the Rich: The Emergence of the Public Defender, 3
CRIME & SOC. JUST. 2 (1975).
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obtain their own attorneys.49 The tendency toward mass plea
bargaining for indigent defendants, Barak argued, was merely an
expression of this design. 0 This enabled the more affluent clients,
represented by private attorneys, to benefit from full adversarial
trials."
ii. 1970s-1980s: The Process Is the Punishment
The early studies of lower courts influenced a "golden age" of
courtroom ethnography in the 1970s and 1980s, which was less tied to
the instrumental Marxist perspectives and less cynical about defense
attorneys. What characterizes literature of this era is that it places
defense practices in the broader organizational context of the
courtroom, and particularly that it considers plea bargaining as the
function of an interaction between the various actors in the system."
As opposed to the literature from the 1960s, which saw plea bargains
as a travesty perpetuating injustice on a massive scale, this
ethnography saw plea bargains as the logical extension and corollary
of the adversarial system."
In their seminal 1977 work Felony Justice, James Eisenstein and
Herbert Jacob referred to trials as "slow pleas."- In comparing case
disposition in various jurisdictions, they explained that the main
factor in determining courts' handling of cases was the interaction and
decisionmaking process of the courtroom workgroup: the judiciary,
the prosecution, and the defense." Any differences in case processing
and outcomes resulted from "complex interactions among members
of the courtroom workgroup as it operated in a particular
organizational environment governed by local and State ordinances,
laws, rules, and traditions."" Among other factors, they focused on
the quality of working relationships, the amount of authority and
freedom actors had within each part of the workgroup, and the
general climate in the city. 7 Trials were more frequent in cities in
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HAND-
LING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (Russell Sage Found., 1979).
53. Id.
54. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZ-
ATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS, at v (Univ. Press of Am., 1977).
55. Id. at 37, 63.
56. Emmelman, supra note 32, at 5.
57. See generally EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 54.
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which working relationships were less conducive to plea bargaining,
and in which the existing culture was less cooperative. 8
The definitive analysis of the era is Malcolm Feeley's classic
work, The Process Is the Punishment.9 As the title implies, Feeley's
study of the New Haven lower courts suggested that defendants plead
guilty en masse-not out of fear of severe punishment, but because
the trial process was so cumbersome, incomprehensible, and time
consuming.? In his chapter on defense attorneys, Feeley showed that
their frustration in the work resembled more social work than "real
lawyering," i.e., trial work. Rejecting the theory that mass plea
bargains stemmed from the need to regulate the pressure valve of
heavy caseloads, Feeley argued that the process was designed to
make trials less attractive, thus aiding defense attorneys in procuring
pleas.
The organizational literature was far more forgiving of plea
bargains, and sometimes favored plea-heavy jurisdictions over their
more litigious counterparts. Pamela Utz, who compared case
disposition in two counties, found that the differences in discretion
and negotiation were the product of working relations." One of the
counties was more adversarial than the other, which Utz explained as
a function of resource availability. Utz concluded that the
collaborative county, which yielded more plea bargains, was a better
model both in terms of system efficiency and in terms of outcomes for
the defendant. That defense attorneys were more willing to negotiate
and admit pleas was the product of various factors beyond the quality
of representation.
James Eisenstein, Roy Flemming, and Peter Nardulli compared
nine criminal court jurisdictions in three states, focusing their
explanation of the differences on the distinctions between
communities." They found, again, that the rate and style of plea
negotiations had to do with the attitudes of-and relationships
between-court actors, the legal culture of different courts, and the
broader context of the community and its culture (such as, notably,
58. Id. at 239.
59. See generally FEELEY, supra note 52.
60. In the 1970s, punishment for misdemeanors in lower courts was fairly lenient and
often consisted of fines and/or probation.
61. PAMELA J. UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN
CRIMINAL COURT (1978).
62. P. NARDULLI, J. EISENSTEIN & R. FLEMMING, THE TENOR OF JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS (1988).
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the size of the court community)." Peter Nardulli's The Courtroom
Elite also placed defense attorneys in the context of their working
environments, analyzing their roles in relation to prosecutors and
judges."
iii. 1980s and Onward: Defense and Plea Bargaining in Cultural
Perspective
Many newer studies of defense counsel behavior in the context of
plea bargaining tend to continue the trend of empathy and
understanding for the bigger context in which defense attorneys
operate. These studies tend to be even less critical of defense
attorneys' performance, praising their commitment to their clients,
empathizing with the serious economic constraints and reputational
challenges they face, and approaching plea bargains as acceptable
methods of case disposition that highlight and require important
professional skills.
Lynn Mather's ethnography of defense attorneys examined how
public defenders decide on case disposition strategy." She found that
they primarily weighed two sound and legitimate factors: the
evidentiary strength of the prosecution's case and the expected
severity of the sentence, which they calculated as a function of the
seriousness of the charge and the defendant's criminal record. In
comparing how private and public defenders operated, she found
comparable quality of decisionmaking. Similarly, Debra Emmelman
found that a law firm that provided representation to the indigent
under a contract with the county operated similarly, by calculating the
"value of the case" based on legitimate factors of severity of the
offense and quality of the evidence."
63. Id. ch. 10. The "court community" perspective views the court as a social world,
consisting of workgroups and regular players that establish routines of social interaction.
Factors such as the relationships between courtroom participants (such as prosecutors,
defenders, and judges) and local cultural norms can create geographic variations in case
outcomes. Xia Wang, Criminal Justice Sentencing in Context: The Effect of Social
Environment on Courtroom Decision-making (Apr. 1, 2008), at 9 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Florida State University), available at http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/etd/1260/.
64. PETER F. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978).
65. LYNN MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL
CASE DISPOSITION (1979).
66. Debra S. Emmelman, Gauging the Strength of Evidence Prior to Plea Bargaining:
The Interpretive Procedures of Court-Appointed Defense Attorneys, 22 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 927 (1997).
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Douglas Maynard's linguistic study of plea negotiations provided
further confirmation that defense attorneys' approach to plea
bargaining consisted of predicting how the default option of a trial
would go." Maynard found that plea negotiations seldom took the
form of open-air marketplace haggling, in which parties threw
possible sentences at each other. More often, the negotiations
consisted of contrasting descriptions of the defendant's character and
role in the alleged events, moving toward a shared narrative and a
consensus about the case's objective "worth."
In his 1986 ethnography of public defenders, Roy Flemming
countered Blumberg's accusation that defense attorneys tended to
coerce or "con" their clients into pleading guilty." Flemming found
that, in order to win their clients' confidence and avoid later client
bitterness about the process, which could yield accusations of
professional incompetence, public defense attorneys played an
advisory role rather than a stronger, more insistent, recommendatory
role. As a result, rather than feeling powerless and disenfranchised,
indigent clients were more involved in making decisions about their
own cases.
Another empathetic perspective on defense function was Lisa
McIntyre's analysis of interviews with defense attorneys. 9 McIntyre
argued that public defenders were as effective in representing clients
as private attorneys, even though they continuously suffered from a
"stigma of ineptitude." The court system perpetuated the notion that
one "got what one paid for," and placed public defenders in a tough
spot: While their actual professional performance placed them in
constant need to challenge the system and its legitimacy, this
performance was not reflected in their perception by other actors,
including their own clients, leaving them in "the shadow of
disrepute."
Debra Emmelman's Justice for the Poor, published in 2003 but
based on fieldwork from the late 1980s, examined a law firm
contracting with the county to provide indigent legal defense.70
67. DOUGLAS MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF
NEGOTIATION (1984). See also Douglas W. Maynard, Narratives and Narrative Structure
in Plea Bargaining, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 449 (1988).
68. Roy B. Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their
Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253 (1986).
69. LISA MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
SHADOWS OF REPUTE (1987).
70. DEBRA S. EMMELMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: A STUDY OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE WORK (2003).
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Emmelman's impressions were that defense attorneys were not the
cynical "con men" Blumberg described, but rather idealistic and
zealous advocates for their clients. Their advice to clients to plead
guilty stemmed not from selfish calculation, but from the fact that the
defendants, indigent and disenfranchised, were going to suffer serious
disadvantages at trial.
A recent and particularly interesting example of this evolving,
and more forgiving, perspective on defense attorneys in procuring
guilty pleas is Kuo-Chang Huang, Kong-Pin Chen and Chang-Chin
Lin's study of defense practice in Taiwan." Huang, Chen and Lin
took advantage of a legal reform in Taiwan, which phased out the
respectable and powerful public defender system to one that
randomly assigned clients to public defenders or private attorneys
under a legal-aid contract.72  Using trial data from 2004 to 2007,
Huang et al. found that while public defenders and government-
contracted legal aid attorneys performed comparably in terms of
quality, they tended to adopt different litigation strategies.
Specifically, the defendants whom public defenders represented
tended to have higher conviction rates, but received shorter sentences
upon conviction.74 In Taiwan, where reliance on plea bargaining is
much less than in the U.S., this consisted less of negotiating tactics
and more of securing judicial leniency. One of the notable things
about the study is that Huang et al. explained these findings by
appealing to different notions of professionalism: Public defenders
thought of their role as more holistic, aimed at helping clients sort out
their lives and solve their problems beyond the trial.
This benign explanation stands in stark contrast to the literary
assumptions of the classic studies of the 1960s and 1970s. Those
studies saw plea bargaining as a professionally inferior strategy. This
shift indicates the changed perception, not only of plea bargaining,
but also of public defender systems and defense functions.
71. Kuo-Chang Huang, Kong-Pin Chen & Chang-Ching Lin, Does the Type of
Criminal Defense Counsel Affect Case Outcomes? A Natural Experiment in Taiwan, 30
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 113 (2010). The differences between the Taiwanese and American
systems are, of course, not without importance: Taiwan relies much less than the United
States on plea bargaining, and guilty pleas are for the most part presented to the judge as
part of an overall appeal for leniency in sentencing.
72. Id. at 114.
73. Id. at 122.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 122-23.
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The empirical literature on defense attorneys, therefore, has
gradually moved away from wholesale condemnation of defense
attorneys for their tendency to plea bargain, to a more empathetic
perspective. Newer approaches tend to be more sympathetic to the
organizational and cultural constraints under which defense attorneys
operate. These approaches accept plea bargaining as a legitimate
litigation strategy, which sometimes serves the client better than
going to trial. One could attribute this change to an improvement in
the quality of defense in general, and public defense systems in
particular, or to a less critical and more nuanced scholarly approach,
or to both. Notably, this research predates the public defense crisis
wrought by the financial crisis of 2008, which led to several lawsuits
brought by public defense offices arguing that their depleted
resources did not allow them to provide personalized quality
representation to clients." These serious constraints raise the
question of whether judicial or ethical review of defense performance
in plea bargaining is possible.
C. The Legal Context: Charge Bargaining, Opacity, and Truth
One of the main challenges in assessing defense attorney
performance in plea bargaining is that plea negotiations, in contrast
with trial performance, are often opaque and therefore immune from
critique. As Wright and Miller argue, the shift toward determinate
sentencing, which resulted in more severe sentencing across the
board, divested judges and parole boards of their former broad
discretion." This shift relegated such discretion not only to the
creators of the sentencing structure (legislatures and sentencing
commissions), but also to prosecutors who, as the charging authority,
could almost singlehandedly determine the sentence by their choice
of charge.79
The result has been to place prosecutors in "the key
administrative role, as . . . quasi-judge[s]," and have adapted to
determinate sentencing, bypassing the severe limitations that rigid
sentences and mandatory minimums create, and bargaining in charges
76. See, e.g., Scott Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of
Indigent Defense Standards, 31 S.U. L. REV. 245 (2004).
77. See, e.g., Eckholm, supra note 35.
78. Wright & Miller, supra note 8. For a critique of this sentencing structure from a
judicial perspective, see generally Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998).
79. See generally Wright & Miller, supra note 8.
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instead." For this reason, most plea bargaining has moved away from
a model of "sentence bargaining"-agreeing on a mutually acceptable
sentence to present to the judge who, in an era of determinate
sentencing, has little sentencing discretion anyway-especially with
regard to felonies. Instead, plea bargaining has shifted toward
"charge bargaining," which consists of agreeing on a different charge,
or fewer charges, carrying a lesser sentence on the rigid sentencing
grid. Because of the prevalence of charge bargaining, the map of
criminal convictions does not necessarily reflect the initial charges,
but rather the compromise obtained through the bargain. An opaque
system, impermeable to criticism, produces these convictions. As
Wright and Miller explain, "the public cannot tell the difference
between reasonable and unreasonable charge bargains. Nobody can
know after the fact which bargains are 'good' bargains, based on
sound reasons, and which ones are 'bad' bargains, reflecting
overcharging or sloppiness by the prosecutor or undue pressures
created by dramatic plea/trial sentencing differentials."'
The federal appellate system's difficulty identifying pleas that are
the product of "manipulation" or "circumvention" of the federal
sentencing guidelines, in violation of the federal sentencing rules,
exacerbates the difficulty of ex post facto assessment of plea
bargaining in general. Early research conducted on the issue
"suggested that 20% to 35% of all bargains were the product of
'circumvention"" and found that the primary problem with
circumvention of sentencing guidelines is its hidden and unsystematic
nature." While Wright and Miller focus on the difficulties in
reviewing prosecutorial behavior, their arguments are relevant to
defense attorneys as well. The confusion that charge bargaining and
80. Id. at 1417.
81. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (2010), tbl.
5.22.2010, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (indicating that
97.4% of all convictions in U.S. district courts were obtained through guilty pleas). See
also SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (2006), tbl. 5.46.2006,
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (indicating that 94% of
all felony convictions in U.S. state courts were obtained through guilty pleas).
82. Wright & Miller, supra note 8, at 1411.
83. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta
Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1312 (1997).
84. Access to prosecutors' case files made this research possible. Replicating this
study would require the United States State Department's permission, which the State
Department is unlikely to grant, to access to their files to allow further research. Wright &
Miller, supra note 8, at 1411-12 n.8.
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"circumvention" create makes it difficult to trace the considerations
on the defense side as well.
Not all criminal justice analysts agree that charge bargaining has
been universally bad for the defense. Notably, Judge Gerard Lynch
claims that in an administrative system, the best opportunity for the
defense to test the prosecutor's initial impression of a case occurs
during the plea process." Lynch maintains that the defense's
opportunity to present evidence, challenge the prosecutor, and argue
defenses and mitigating circumstances remains strongest during plea
negotiations." As a result, Lynch considers charge bargaining a
powerful tool for the defense and opposes efforts to diminish its
viability."
Wright and Miller respond to Lynch's opposing view by pointing
out that his idealist view of plea negotiations does not resemble
reality in most places. "In state systems, and especially in the high-
volume systems of urban areas, defense attorneys have far less time
and money to devote to each criminal defendant."" In order to
achieve any level of transparency, Wright and Miller argue, the
shifting charges resulting from charge bargaining must cease and
prosecutors' decisions to bring particular charges must merit some
objective meaning.
The system of plea bargaining requires that a particular charge,
against a particular defendant and based on a particular set of facts,
be "worth" a specific range of sentence severity. Awarding a "value"
to criminal charges places the system of plea bargaining into a kind of
marketing system. Just as marketing systems can vary in their
operation, so too can the plea bargaining system. For instance, some
markets expect people to "haggle," as in an open-air "bazaar,"8 9 while
other markets expect consumers to pay the asking price, as in a
supermarket.
85. "Judge Lynch has served on the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York since 2000. He has on several occapons worked as a federal
prosecutor in the Southern District, including two years spent as chief of the criminal
division on leave from his professorship at Columbia. He has also served as defense
counsel in federal and state cases." Wright & Miller, supra note 8, at 1409 n.2.
86. Id. at 1409-1414.
87. Id. at 1413.
88. Id. at 1414.
89. See John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the
Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (1977) (referring to the plea
bargaining table as a "bazaar," to describe the free-form negotiations and the moral
neutrality ascribed to the players therein).
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Lynch uses this analogy and argues that plea systems motivated
by charge bargaining do not reach for unrealistic "values" with the
hope of splitting the difference. In other words, Lynch seems to view
the current plea bargaining system, which relies heavily on charge
bargaining, as a parallel to the supermarket model: A defendant
("consumer") receives an objective "bang for his buck." Wright and
Miller point out flaws in this analogy and seem to equate the current
plea bargaining system with a system of haggling, where "consumers"
receive a wide range of offers for the same product. They further
distinguish Lynch's analogy by inferring that, in the current system of
plea bargaining, "consumers" have no way to compare the "values"
of their cases, because the lack of transparency in the prosecutorial
choice of a charge, as well as the intricate defense expertise in
navigating the aisles of the "supermarket of charges," prevent any
meaningful review.
Regardless of whether plea bargaining, and charge bargaining in
particular, is a necessary evil or an extension of the adversarial
process, negotiation requires a different set of skills than litigation.
The Supreme Court and many lower courts have addressed specific
aspects of defense practice in plea bargaining through the mechanism
of ineffective assistance of counsel-a post-conviction assessment of
the quality of representation and its impact on the outcome of the
case.' Professional associations have also attempted to provide some
guidelines for plea bargaining. It is to these regulatory mechanisms
that we now turn.
II. Regulating Defense Quality Through Courts: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
The problems involved in providing counsel during the plea
bargaining process remained the provenance of social scientists until
the mid-1980s, when the Supreme Court became interested in the
quality of defense as a post-conviction argument. Not long after the
landmark decision in Strickland v. Washington,9' the Court applied its
lessons to plea bargaining. However, twenty-five years would pass
before the Court fleshed out its specific expectations from defense
attorneys in the negotiation process, as well as its opinion on the
90. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and the subsequent cases
described below that have relied on its holdings.
91. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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appropriate remedies for inadequate defense in the context of
negotiation.
A. The Strickland Standard and Its Progeny
i. The Performance and Prejudice Prongs
Since its issuance, the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington has been the touchstone to determine claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.' The constitutional basis for a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a criminal conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, has two elements. The first
element is that the defendant's legal representation fell below the
minimum standards inherent in the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.93 The second element is that, having no effective assistance
of counsel, the trial was therefore fundamentally unfair,94 thereby
violating the defendant's Fifth Amendment" and Fourteenth
Amendment' rights to due process of law.97
In Strickland, the trial judge sentenced the defendant, David
Leroy Washington, to death after Washington pleaded guilty to three
92. "Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the settled doctrine of
Strickland v. Washington." 27 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
644.61[1] (2014).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). An indigent criminal
defendant's right to court-appointed legal counsel at trial was established in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Supreme Court affirmed that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a right to counsel that is not only present, but also competent and effective, in
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (holding that "defendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel," and that "the right
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel"). Id. at 771 n.14.
94. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ("The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.").
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
96. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."). See also 27 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 644.61[1] ("[D]efendant must demonstrate that the
deficient performance was prejudicial to the defense, that counsel's errors were
sufficiently serious to deprive the defendant of a fair trial-a trial with reliable results.").
97. The Supreme Court defines "a fair trial" as "one in which evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in
advance of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
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capital murder charges.' Washington's defense neither sought nor
presented any psychiatric evidence or character witnesses to support
Washington's claims of mitigating circumstances." The attorney
relied instead on Washington's having informally "mention[ed]"'0 the
extenuating circumstances surrounding the murders during
Washington's plea colloquy with the judge.'o The Supreme Court
held that this representation was not deficient, and laid out a two-part
test to judge such claims."o
First, the Court held that the defendant must prove that his or
her attorney's conduct "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."1 03  Courts determining this standard should be
"highly deferential."'" Prevailing professional norms are useful as
guides, but courts must also consider the totality of the circumstances
98. Washington pleaded guilty against his attorney's advice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
672. Although Washington's attorney only represented him at sentencing, not at trial, the
Supreme Court, reviewing Washington's habeas corpus petition, considered a capital
sentencing hearing to be sufficiently trial-like in its statutory requirements of presentation
of aggravating and mitigating factors that the same standards for effective assistance of
counsel should apply in the sentencing hearing as at trial. Id. at 687.
99. Id. at 674.
100. Id. at 699.
101. Id. at 674. During the sentencing hearing, Washington's attorney relied heavily
on Washington's spontaneous guilty plea:
Counsel argued that respondent's remorse and acceptance of
responsibility justified sparing him from the death penalty. . . . He
further argued that respondent should be spared death because he had
surrendered, confessed, and offered to testify against a codefendant
and because respondent was fundamentally a good person who had
briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful circumstances.
Id. at 673-74.
102. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor explained,
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
Id. at 687.
103. Id. at 688.
104. Id. at 689.
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"from counsel's perspective at the time"-rather than reevaluating
the facts in hindsight.os
Second, the Court held that the defendant must demonstrate
actual prejudice. Harmless error is not reversible. Therefore, the
defendant must show that a reasonable judge or jury-the court
assesses such "reasonable fact-finding" by statutory norms, rather
than by hypothetical appeals to emotion or by the particular
sympathies of any individual judge or jury-would likely have
reached a different result if not for the defense lawyer's errors.
The Strickland Court carved out two exceptions to the prejudice
requirement: "Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether"'" and defense attorney conflicts of interest." The
105. Id. Given the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance[,]" the Court
held,
[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment. . . . [S]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.
Id. at 689-91.
106. Id. at 694-95. The second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant to
prove
[T]hat there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, . . . the factfinder would have had a reasonable
doubt respecting guilt. When a defendant challenges a death sentence
... , the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that,
absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant
death."
Id. The Court elaborated, "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. . . . Thus, evidence about the actual process of
decision, if not part of the record of the proceeding under review, . . . should not be
considered in the prejudice determination." Id.
107. Id. at 692 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), in which the
Supreme Court held that where "the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his
trial[, or] . . . counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful
adversarial testing," the defendant need not prove actual prejudice. The Cronic Court
added that proof of actual prejudice was unnecessary where, "the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the
trial." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60.). The Cronic court reiterated, nonetheless, that in
almost all cases, "because we presume that the lawyer is competent to provide the guiding
hand that the defendant needs, . . . the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate a
constitutional violation." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
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Court added, however, that such cases of actual or constructive denial
of counsel would be "easy to identify and ... prevent," and therefore
exceedingly rare."
ii. The AEDPA Requires Appellants to Show That State Courts
Unreasonably Applied Strickland
The U.S. Congress cemented a draconian rule when it passed the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA")."o The AEDPA modified the Federal Habeas Corpus
Statutes" to limit post-conviction habeas corpus relief to reversal of
final state court rulings that run "contrary to, or . . . unreasonabl[y]
appl[y] . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States."" 2 This effectively prohibits
federal district and circuit courts of appeal from granting habeas
petitions that fail to meet the strict Supreme Court standards
expressed in Strickland and its progeny.11
In several cases, the Supreme Court has elaborated upon
Strickland. For example, in Wiggins v. Smith,1" the Court referred to
the American Bar Association Guidelines"' to determine the minimal
108. The Court cautioned, however, that "[p]rejudice is presumed only if the
defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that
'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."' Strickland,
466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348,350 (1980)).
109. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
110. Pub. L. No., 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 48 U.S.C.) (specifically, "Habeas Corpus Reform," tit. 1, sec. 104,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(i)).
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-66.
112. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
113. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), added by AEDPA); Anthony E. Rufo,
Opportunity Lost?-The Ineffective Assistance Doctrine's Applicability to Foregone Plea
Bargains, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 709, 720-21 (2009).
114. Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510.
115. The Wiggins Court illustrated,
The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating
evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence
that may be introduced by the prosecutor." ... [These include] medical
history, educational history, employment and training history, family
and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and
religious and cultural influences. . . . "The lawyer also has a substantial
and important role to perform in raising mitigating factors both to the
prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing. . . ."
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considerations necessary for an attorney's conduct to meet the
Strickland standard of "reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms.""6
Retreating from the Wiggins expansion of Strickland protections,
in Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court raised the Strickland bar
for actual prejudice (that, absent counsel's unprofessional errors,
defendant would have been "reasonably likely",' to receive a
different trial result) nearly to the "preponderance of the evidence""'
level initially rejected in Strickland."' Furthermore, Harrington
interpreted the AEDPA to prohibit federal courts from applying
their own Strickland analysis to state supreme court decisions,
requiring them instead to consider only "whether the state court's
application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable."120
Furthering the Court's AEDPA deference to state court
interpretations of Strickland, in Schriro v. Landrigan, the Supreme
Court denied Strickland relief where the defendant had refused to
allow his attorney to present mitigating evidence at trial.12 ' The
Id. at 524-25 (emphasis omitted) (citing ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES §§ 11.4.1(C), 11.8.6 (1989); 1
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, cmt. 4-55 (2d ed.1982)).
116. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521.
117. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
118. Id. at 694.
119. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011) ("Strickland... does not require
a showing that counsel's actions 'more likely than not altered the outcome,' but the
difference between Strickland's prejudice standard and a more-probable-than-not
standard is slight and matters 'only in the rarest case.' . . . The likelihood of a different
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.").
120. Id. at 785. "For purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1) [under the AEDPA], 'an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal
law.' A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation
when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself." Id. (citation omitted).
The Court elaborated,
The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly
deferential," and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so
. . . . The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of
reasonable applications is substantial. ... When § 2254(d) applies, the
question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The
question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.
Id. at 788 (internal citations omitted). For a student note analyzing the arguments that the
state and the defendant raised, as viewed through the filter of the AEDPA, see generally
Kara Duffle, Note, Harrington v. Richter: AEDPA Deference and the Right to Effective
Counsel, 6 DUKE J. CONsT. L. & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 54 (2011).
121. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007) (It was "not objectively
unreasonable for [the Arizona State] court to conclude that a defendant who refused to
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Schriro Court further barred the defendant from raising arguments in
his federal habeas petition that he had not fully developed in state
court.12
B. Hill v. Lockhart Applies Strickland to the Plea-Bargaining Context
i. Hill Requires a Defendant to Show That, but for Defense Counsel's
Ineffective Assistance, the Defendant Likely Would Have Rejected the
Proffered Plea Deal
In Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court held that "the two-part
Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas
based on ineffective assistance of counsel."'" That is, the defendant
must first show that his or her decision to plead guilty was not truly
"voluntary and intelligent" 12 4 because it was based on counsel's advice
that fell outside "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases"'" and "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.""' Second, the Hill Court required the defendant to
"show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial."'27
Hill holds that, to be relevant to the determination of
"prejudice," a reasonably competent defense attorney's assessment of
the risks and benefits of going to trial must have influenced the
defendant's decision of whether to go to trial when that trial would
reasonably result in an acquittal.'" The Hill Court further considered
allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice
based on his counsel's failure to investigate further possible mitigating evidence.").
122. The Schriro Court elaborated that, even if "Landrigan's decision not to present
mitigating evidence [was not] 'informed and knowing,' . . . Landrigan failed to develop this
claim properly before the Arizona courts, and [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(e)(2) [under the
AEDPA] therefore barred the District Court from granting an evidentiary hearing on that
basis." Id. at 479 (internal citations omitted).
123. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). The Court reaffirmed this judgment in
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004), holding that "[t]he entry of a guilty plea, whether to
a misdemeanor or a felony charge, ranks as a 'critical stage' at which the [Sixth
Amendment] right to counsel adheres."
124. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56.
125. Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
126. Id. at 57 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).
127. Id. at 59.
128. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist explained,
In many guilty plea cases, the "prejudice" inquiry will closely resemble
the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance
challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where
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counsel's erroneous advice regarding potential sentencing and parole
outcomes to be irrelevant to the "prejudice" inquiry because those
sentencing factors did not bear directly on the likelihood of
conviction. 2 9
ii. Subsequent Cases Narrow Hill to Preserve State Court Convictions by
Plea
Several Supreme Court cases narrow and clarify Hill's
application of Strickland in plea-bargaining contexts, particularly to
avoid "too easily set[ting] aside" a guilty plea, thereby "erod[ing]" the
plea's penological purposes of "[a]cknowledging guilt and accepting
responsibility." 3 0
In Premo v. Moore, for example, the Court held that, even
though defense counsel failed to move to suppress Randy Moore's
inadmissible confession to police before advising him to plead no
contest to felony murder, 3' counsel's advice was nonetheless
reasonable because the prosecution could still have developed other,
admissible evidence against the defendant.'32 Premo affirms the
gravity and complexity of plea negotiations that a court must analyze
when applying Strickland, reiterating that "[t]he art of negotiation is
the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover
potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination.. . will depend on
the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to
change his recommendation as to the plea . . . [based on] whether the
evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly,
where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant
of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution
of the "prejudice" inquiry will depend largely on whether the
affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.
Id.
129. Id. at 60.
130. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011). Analyzing results of habeas petitions
after pleas accepted or declined based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Anthony Rufo
explains, "the relief for a plea bargain accepted due to ineffective assistance is equivalent
to the relief generally provided for claims of ineffective assistance at trial-vacating the
plea with an opportunity for authorities to pursue a new trial." Rufo, supra note 113, at
718 n.75.
131. Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 744 ("A defendant who accepts a plea bargain on counsel's
advice does not necessarily suffer prejudice when his counsel fails to seek suppression of
evidence, even if it would be reversible error for the court to admit that evidence.").
132. Id. at 742 ("Moore's prospects at trial were ... anything but certain." The Court
infers that the certainty in a guilty plea is not sufficiently different from the uncertainty of
trial to establish prejudice under Strickland.).
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at least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy and it presents
questions farther removed from immediate judicial supervision."'
In Breard v. Greene, the Supreme Court denied habeas relief
under Hill to Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national
sentenced to death in Virginia.'" Breard claimed that the state should
have informed him of his right to consular assistance, pursuant to the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,"' before he made his
decision to forgo the state's offer of a guilty plea."
Another decision, United States v. Dominguez Benitez, although
not directly referencing Hill, does nonetheless significantly limit the
Strickland analysis in the plea-bargaining context. In Dominguez
Benitez, the Supreme Court denied habeas relief under Strickland to
a non-English-speaking defendant;'37 the federal district court had
failed to warn the defendant that he had no right to withdraw the plea
if the court did not follow the recommendation or request that the
prosecution had made pursuant to his plea agreement.13' Reaffirming
the requirement of actual prejudice, as expressed in Hill, the Court
held that despite this violation of the defendant's rights under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant must
nonetheless "show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he
would not have entered the plea."'39  The Court conceded that the
133. Id. at 741. The Premo Court explained,
The opportunities ... include pleading to a lesser charge and obtaining
a lesser sentence, as compared with what might be the outcome not
only at trial but also from a later plea offer.. . . A risk . . . is that an
early plea bargain might come before the prosecution finds its case is
getting weaker . . . . An attorney often has insights borne of past
dealings with the same prosecutor or court, and the record at the
pretrial stage is never as full as it is after a trial . . . . The prospect that
a plea deal will afterwards be unraveled when a court second-guesses
counsel's decisions . . . could lead prosecutors to forgo plea bargains
that would benefit defendants.
Id. at 741-42.
134. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998).
135. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes
art. 42 , April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
136. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998) (The Court explained that there was
no actual prejudice because "Breard decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own
trial contrary to the advice of his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain the
United States legal system to him than any consular official would have been.").
137. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85 (2004).
138. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(B), located at FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2) at the time,
required the district court to advise the defendant of this risk before allowing him to plead
guilty.
139. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 76.
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defendant "was confused about the law that applied to his sentence,"
as evidenced by his protestations at his sentencing hearing.140
However, the Court concluded that it must nonetheless base its
decision on the objective facts in the record-which showed the
information available to the defendant's attorney at the time the
defendant made his decision-regarding the strength of the
defendant's case, rather than solely on the defendant's subjective post
hoc feelings about the value of his plea.141
iii. Wright v. Patten Bars Federal Courts from Applying Strickland to
"Novel Questions"
In Wright v. Van Patten, the Supreme Court denied Hill relief to
a defendant who had pleaded no contest after a plea hearing in which
his attorney had participated only via speakerphone.142 The Court
held that because "[n]o [prior] decision of this Court[] . . . squarely
addresses the issue in this case, . . . it cannot be said that the state
court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law. . . .
Under the explicit terms of [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1), therefore, relief
is unauthorized."143
The Wright Court's interpretation of the AEDPA'" presented a
Catch-22: It prohibited federal courts (including the Supreme Court)
from applying Strickland to novel situations, effectively freezing
federal Strickland jurisprudence at pre-1996 levels. It held that so
long as there was no "clearly established"145 Supreme Court precedent
dictating state courts' application of Strickland to "novel questions,"'4
the AEDPA compelled reversal of federal courts' novel
interpretations of Strickland granting habeas relief for state court
convictions.4 7  Furthermore, under Harrington, even a federal
140. Id. at 85.
141. Id. The Court elaborated that, although the case's strength is relevant to the
reviewing court's assessment of the plea decision's reasonableness, "[tihe point of the
question is not to second-guess a defendant's actual decision; if it is reasonably probable
he would have gone to trial absent the error, it is no matter that the choice may have been
foolish." Id.
142. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 121 (2008).
143. Id. at 125-26 (internal citations omitted).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (added in 1996 by AEDPA).
145. Wright, 552 U.S. at 126.
146. Id. at 122.
147. Id. at 126. See also Rufo, supra note 113, at 721-26 (discussing the circular
reasoning and the presumption against retroactivity in the Supreme Court's application of
Strickland under the AEDPA).
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affirmation of a state court decision would be unlikely to contribute
to the development of federal Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
because reviewing federal courts could not determine whether a state
court's interpretation of Strickland was "incorrect"-only whether it
was "unreasonable."148
Because of the AEDPA's stranglehold restricting courts'
attempts to apply Strickland to novel questions of federal law,
defendants' Sixth-Amendment rights in plea-bargaining contexts did
not significantly expand until the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye.'49 These three cases are, therefore,
remarkable not only in that they directly address questions pertaining
to defense function in plea bargaining, but also in their willingness, in
the face of Strickland and the AEDPA, to acknowledge deficiencies
in defense practice. The Supreme Court's willingness to intervene in
these recent cases suggests that the Court has a renewed interest in
regulating the quality of defense counsel in the context of plea
bargaining. We now turn to these important developments.
C. Collateral Consequences in Plea Bargaining
i. Padilla and Deportation Consequences
The first herald of a more exacting Supreme Court policy
regarding defense attorney function in plea negotiations arose in a
case disputing the collateral consequences of a conviction. One can
only fully grasp the full meaning of the ruling in Padilla in the context
of the Court's consistent reluctance, prior to 2010, to directly address
collateral consequences as an issue falling within the responsibilities,
not only of defense attorneys, but also of the trial court. For example,
in Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court created the rule that the
Due Process Clause required the trial court to explain only the direct
consequences of conviction.so This narrow approach to punishment,
as Chin and Holmes argue, is immensely problematic in that
"collateral consequences can operate as a secret sentence.".. Even if
the collateral consequences are
148. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
149. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
150. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
151. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 697, 700 (2002).
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[M]uch more severe than the direct consequences,
many courts hold that "neither the trial judge nor
defense counsel is required to explain the 'collateral
consequences' of a guilty plea to the defendant," and
therefore "counsel's failure to advise the defendant of
the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise
to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance." 52
Some examples of such severe consequences, which sometimes
dwarf the "official" punishment in their severity, include revocation
of parole or probation, ineligibility for parole, harsher penalties under
repeat offender laws, consecutive rather than concurrent sentencing,
civil forfeiture, civil commitment, and sex-offender registration
requirements."' Courts routinely deem as "collateral" the effects of
convictions on civil status, such as "disenfranchisement, ineligibility to
serve on a jury, disqualification from public benefits, and ineligibility
to possess firearms. The same is true for deprivations with
tremendous practical consequences, such as . . . dishonorable
discharge from the armed services and loss of business or professional
licenses."15 4 Shockingly, even a defense attorney's failure to inform a
client facing capital charges that a guilty plea to unrelated charges will
constitute an aggravating circumstance in the capital case did not rise
to the level of unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, the categorical distinction in Brady between direct and
collateral consequences made it impossible to ask the Court to assess
the quality of information provided by the defense attorney regarding
collateral consequences on a case-by-case basis, as the Strickland
standard requires."' This meant, practically, that any obligation to
explain to the client the collateral consequences of a guilty plea were
left to professional ethics standards, unsupported by judicial
authority.'
152. Id. (citing Goodall v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. 2000); United
States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985)).
153. Id. at 705.
154. Id. at 705-06.
155. Id. at 701 ("The possibility of execution is a mere collateral consequence.")
(noting King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1994); Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334,
350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536-37 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997)).
156. Chin & Holmes, supra note 151, at 712.
157. Id. The Strickland Court explained that "[p]revailing norms of practice as
reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only
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Indeed, pre-Padilla ethical regulation was not blind to the
problem of collateral consequences in guilty pleas. As Chin and
Holmes state,
The National Prosecution Standards promulgated by
the National District Attorneys Association, for
example, give ample room for consideration of
collateral consequences by prosecutors exercising
discretion. The standards note that "[u]ndue hardship
caused to the accused," the "availability of adequate
civil remedies," and the defendant's waiver of his civil
claims "against victims, witnesses, law enforcement
agencies and their personnel" may be considered in
the decision to charge, to pursue pretrial diversion, or
to take a plea.'
Similarly, the Principles of Federal Prosecution in the United
States Attorney's Manual leave ample room to consider collateral
consequences. These Principles urge a comprehensive approach to
filing charges, including consideration of whether (1) filing the charge
would serve the federal interest; (2) the person subject to effective
prosecution is in another jurisdiction; and (3) there exists an adequate
non-criminal alternative to prosecution."' Chin and Holmes argue
that "[i]f collateral proceedings are relevant to federal prosecutors,
either as add-ons or in lieu of criminal charges, it is hard to see why
competent defense lawyers who are negotiating with the government
should consider them categorically irrelevant," as required by the
collateral consequences rule established in Brady.'o
This approach is consistent with the notion that knowledge of the
collateral consequences of a conviction is essential to a competent
defense.' In addition to the obligation to keep one's client informed
guides." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice is the only source the Court mentioned by name. See id.
158. Chin & Holmes, supra note 151, at 720 (citing NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, Standards 43.6, 44.4 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1991)).
159. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220(B)
(2d ed. 1997).
160. Chin & Holmes, supra note 151, at 721.
161. For example, since Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the defense bar and
the judiciary have needed to educate themselves rapidly about the complex relationships
between the immigration laws and criminal laws. To meet this need, scholars of
immigration law, such as U.C. Davis Professor Raha Jorjani, have begun to serve as in-
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as to the full implications of a guilty plea, some argue that defense
attorneys can use this information as a tool in plea negotiations to
influence the court or prosecutor; accordingly, judges and prosecutors
have also sought to educate themselves about these potential
consequences.162 Defense counsel can utilize collateral consequences
in their effort to persuade the prosecutor to prosecute for a lesser
charge or to decline charging altogether by showing "that a conviction
would be overly punitive." 63
In light of the problematic previous Brady rule, however,'
Padilla represented a revolution in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,
particularly with regard to the criminal defense of noncitizens who
suffer the disparate impact of ill-advised guilty pleas because of laws
requiring automatic deportation pursuant to convictions under a wide
swath of otherwise relatively innocuous criminal offenses, such as
minor drug charges. Previously, habeas corpus relief for noncitizens
facing deportation after having pleaded guilty or no contest to
criminal offenses had been limited to those guilty pleas tendered prior
to the effective date of the AEDPA.16 1 Perhaps because of the
obstacles the AEDPA generally poses to the expansion of habeas
relief, the Padilla Court declined to mention the AEDPA at all.
The case's sympathetic facts may have influenced the Court's
decision. Jose Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of forty years and
an honorably discharged Vietnam veteran, pleaded guilty to
distribution of marijuana based on the advice of his defense
house immigration experts to Public Defenders and as trainers for judges in state courts.
See Raha Jorjani, http://www.1aw.ucdavis.edu/Faculty/Jorjani/index.aspx.
162. For example, a recent course of the National Judicial College, "Sentencing:
Issues, Trends and Best Practices" (Reno, Nev., May 8, 2014) taught judges about the
potential collateral consequences of convictions and guilty pleas.
163. Judson W. Starr & Valerie K. Mann, Environmental Crimes: Parallel Proceedings
and Beyond, ALI-ABA Course of Study No. C921, June 20, 1994, available at Westlaw
C921 ALI-ABA 1051, 1054. See also Judson W. Starr & Valerie K. Mann, Beware of the
Collateral Consequences of an Environmental Violation, ALI-ABA Course of Study No.
C948, Oct. 27, 1994, available at Westlaw C948 ALI-ABA 753, 755 ("collateral
consequences must be included in the calculation of full exposure to liability so the proper
level of attention is devoted to the matter because the broad understanding of the
consequences collateral to an environmental violation is essential to responsible, effective
lawyering" and proposing that "[t]he defending party can affect the likelihood, scope and
impact of collateral consequences, and should be proactive in reducing these complicating
factors").
164. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
165. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-15 (2001) (holding that AEDPA did not
retroactively negate noncitizens' justifiable reliance on their eligibility for a discretionary
waiver of deportability, under the former Immigration and Nationality Act sec. 212(c)
(1995) (eliminated by AEDPA), when pleading guilty to aggravated felonies).
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attorney.'" Padilla's attorney had advised him that such a criminal
conviction would carry no danger of deportation for him, when in
fact, it made deportation "virtually mandatory."'67
The Supreme Court held that "constitutionally competent
counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug
distribution made him subject to automatic deportation," thereby
satisfying the first prong of Strickland. Under the Strickland test's
second prong, the Court remanded his case to the state courts to
determine whether he suffered actual prejudice in the result of his
conviction." The Court reasoned that changes to United States
immigration law over the past century had "dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction."' 9 The Court held that
"as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed,
sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes."'
This classification of deportation as a "penalty,"' rather than a
mere "collateral consequence"'72 of a guilty plea, is essential. Lower
federal courts and state courts have traditionally held that "collateral
consequences are outside the scope of representation required by the
Sixth Amendment, and, therefore, the failure of defense counsel to
advise the defendant of possible deportation consequences is not
cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel."" 3 The
Padilla Court declines to apply the direct/collateral distinction,
however, and considering "[d]eportation as a consequence of a
criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal
process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral
consequence;" the Court applies Strickland to Padilla's claim. 74
Despite the extreme deference in determining ineffective
assistance of counsel prescribed under the combination of Strickland
and the AEDPA,17 1 the Padilla Court nonetheless returned to the
166. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 360, 375.
169. Id. at 364
170. Id.
171. Id. at 364-65.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 365 (internal quotations omitted).
174. Id. at 366.
175. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
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more rigorous standard described in Wiggins,"'76 of "prevailing
[professional] norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards" and similar practice guides.'" The Padilla
Court established the standard that, where the immigration statutes
are clear, "counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation."178  The Court qualified this standard by holding that,
where the statute is unclear, "a criminal defense attorney need do no
more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.",
The full extent of Padilla's reach in non-immigration contexts is
unknown. Although Padilla was a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court
decided the issue of collateral consequences only 5-4.'" Both Justice
Alito's concurrence 8 ' and Justice Scalia's dissent'" strongly criticized
the Court's failure to rule on whether failing to warn criminal
defendants of the collateral consequences to guilty pleas may justify
overturning convictions based on those pleas. Justice Stevens
dismissed those concerns by pointing out that critics raised a similar
"floodgates" concern in Hill, and that the flood of challenges to guilty
pleas had failed to materialize.
176. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).
177. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 377 (Alito, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 369 (majority opinion).
180. "Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which Roberts, C.J., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J.,
joined." Id. at 358.
181. Id. at 376 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito pointed out that
[C]riminal convictions can carry a wide variety of consequences ...
including civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss of the right to
vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess
firearms, dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of
business or professional licenses.... [T]his Court has never held that a
criminal defense attorney's Sixth Amendment duties extend to
providing advice about such matters.
Id.
182. Id. at 390 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[aidding to counsel's duties an
obligation to advise about a conviction's collateral consequences has no logical stopping-
point").
183. Id. at 371-373. Justice Stevens elaborates,
Pleas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions. But they
account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed. The
nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty
plea-an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial-
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ii. Subsequent Cases Limit Padilla's Application in Deportation
Challenges
The Padilla holding has met with uneven application in the
United States Courts of Appeals, even in the limited immigration
contexts addressed in the majority opinion. For example, in Morris v.
Holder, the Second Circuit held that even though the Padilla court
classified deportation as a "penalty," which is "intimately related to
the criminal process,"'" nonetheless "deportation and removal are
civil proceedings," not criminal, and therefore "statutes retroactively
setting criteria for deportation do not violate the ex post facto clause"
of the United States Constitution. Additionally, because
immigration proceedings do not technically carry criminal penalties,
the legal right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants that
Gideon v. Wainright86 secured does not apply." Finally, in Chaidez v.
United States, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the Padilla
standard is not retroactive and does not afford relief on direct review
to defendants whose convictions became final before the Padilla
ruling."
Moreover, because administrative agencies, rather than criminal
courts, generally handle immigration claims, procedural obstacles to
Padilla's implementation abound. In Valencia v. Holder, the Fifth
Circuit held that a defendant must first raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under Padilla in a motion to the United States
Board of Immigration Appeals, before the Circuit Court would have
[causes] ... those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas [to] lose the
benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea.
Id.
184. Morris v. Holder, 676 F.3d 309, 317 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at
365).
185. Id. at 316-17.
186. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
187. Ian Urbina and Catherine Rentz, Immigrant Detainees and the Right to Counsel,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2013, at SR4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/sunday
-review/immigrant-detainees-and-the-right-to-counsel.html. To those presenting immigra-
tion claims, however, there is very little difference between immigration detention and
prison, and many asylum seekers consider deportation a death sentence.
188. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013). See also Chaidez v. United
States, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW (Aug. 30, 2013,
11:52 PM), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_820; Chaidez v. United
States, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 30, 2013 11:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/chaidez-v-united-states/; Lyle Denniston, New look at lawyers' advice,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/new-look-
at-lawyers-advice/.
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jurisdiction to review the underlying question of deportability.'" In
Waugh v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit held that Sixth Amendment
claims under Padilla notwithstanding, "an alien cannot collaterally
attack the legitimacy of a state criminal conviction in a deportation
proceeding."'9 In United States v. Chang Hong, the Tenth Circuit also
held that "Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review." 91
The importance of Padilla in bringing immigration penalties
more closely within the ambit of criminal jurisprudence and the
constitutional protections of criminal proceedings remain topics of
hot controversy.'" For our purposes, however, the significant
achievement of Padilla was in signaling the Supreme Court's
willingness to examine the often-invisible world of plea negotiations
and intervene when defense counsel's function in explaining the plea
was deficient. This was a considerable departure from the pre-Padilla
trend to leave such matters in the hands of ethical regulators, and it
heralded further dramatic developments in the judicial establishment
of basic standards for effective assistance of counsel in plea
bargaining.
D. Quality of Plea Bargaining: Lafler, Frye, and the "Jurisprudence of
Plea Bargaining"
In the aftermath of Padilla, the Supreme Court's willingness to
venture into other aspects of the plea-bargaining process and examine
defense performance considerably expanded. On March 21, 2012, the
Court issued two companion opinions, Lafler v. Cooper93 and
Missouri v. Frye,'94 both authored by Justice Kennedy in 5-4 decisions
189. Valencia v. Holder, 425 F. App'x 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2011).
190. Waugh v. Holder, 642 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Trench v. INS,
783 F.2d 181,184 (10th Cir.1986)).
191. United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2011), as amended
Sept. 1, 2011.
192. See, e.g., W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re
Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2011); Rachel
A. Cartier, Padilla's Collateral Attack Effect on Existing Federal Convictions, 6 CRIM. L.
BRIEF 58 (2010); John E. D. Larkin, A Proposed Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness
of Counsel Under Padilla v. Kentucky, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 565 (2011); Maryellen
Meymarian, Providing Immigration Advice During Criminal Proceedings: Preempting
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims When Non-Citizen Aliens Seek to Withdraw
Guilty Pleas to Avoid Adverse Immigration Consequences, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53 (2011).
193. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
194. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.'' In
essence, Lafler and Frye applied Hill in reverse. Whereas Hill
required defendants to demonstrate that, but for ineffective
assistance of counsel at the plea-bargaining stage, they would have
insisted on going to trial,'" Lafler and Frye required defendants to
demonstrate that had their attorneys advised them properly, they
would likely have accepted an earlier plea deal." In both cases, the
Supreme Court held that the respondents had met the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded the cases for the state
courts for further proceedings.'98
i. Frye and the Failure to Timely Convey a Proffered Plea Deal
In Missouri v. Frye, Prosecutors initially charged Galin Frye with
driving on a revoked license, a felony with a maximum prison
sentence of four years.'9 Although the prosecutor offered plea
bargains potentially reducing Frye's sentence to only ten days in jail
under a felony conviction, or to ninety days with a misdemeanor
conviction, Frye's attorney failed to convey those offers to him before
they expired.2" Two days after the expiration date, the police
arrested Frye again on the same charge; at his hearing, he pleaded
guilty and the trial court sentenced him to three years'
imprisonment.20 1 Frye contended that he would have pleaded guilty
to the misdemeanor had his attorney informed him of that option.2 02
The central issue on appeal, therefore, was whether his attorney's
failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.203
Like Padilla, Frye does not mention the AEDPA at all. This is
likely because the Frye Court was only affirming the Missouri Court
of Appeals' determination that the respondent's assistance of counsel
had failed the Strickland standard, rather than imposing federal
195. Anthony Franze & Jeremy McLaughlin, Opinion analysis: Expanding the right to
effective counsel during the plea-bargaining process, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:30
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/opinion-analysis-expanding-the-right-to-effective
-counsel-during-the-plea-bargaining-process/.
196. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
197. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410.
198. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411.
199. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1404-05.
202. Id. at 1405.
203. Id.
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habeas relief to overturn a state conviction.20 Without the AEDPA's
strictures, the Court was free to expound upon its reasons for
affirming the state appellate court ruling and, using dicta, could
thereby exercise a long overdue creation of new Strickland doctrine.205
A central element of the Frye Court's reasoning was its forceful
reiteration of Padilla's insistence that "the negotiation of a plea
bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel."20 Building on
Hill, the Frye Court held the plea-bargaining phase to be so essential
to a just trial result that effective assistance of counsel in plea
negotiations required objective standards and guidelines.207
The Frye Court, therefore, held that, "as a general rule, defense
counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the
prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be
favorable to the accused." 208 The Court elaborated that "the fact of a
formal offer means that its terms and its processing can be
documented" and that "[s]tates may elect to follow rules that all
offers must be in writing, again to ensure against later
misunderstandings or fabricated charges."20 The Court further
advised, "formal offers can be made part of the record . . . to ensure
that a defendant has been fully advised."210
The Frye Court reiterated that although "the standard for
counsel's performance is not determined solely by reference to
codified standards of professional practice, these standards can be
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1407-08.
206. Id. at 1406 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010)). The Court
emphasized the practical reality supporting this conclusion:
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of
state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. . . . [P]lea bargains have
become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system
that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process,
responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of
counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages. Because ours is for the most part a system of pleas, not
a system of trials, . . . it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee
of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial
process.
Id. at 1407 (internal citations omitted).
207. Id. at 1408.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1409.
210. Id.
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important guides."211 The Court accordingly based its three
recommended standards-prompt communication of formal plea
offers, that prosecutors make formal plea offers in writing, and that
such writings be made part of the trial record-on numerous
examples of ABA recommended standards, state rules of court, and
state rules of professional conduct.212 This may be a signal that the
Court is returning from its previous lenient assessments of
effectiveness in plea negotiations, as expressed in Premo.213 The
Court may be shifting toward more rigorous standards, including by
reference to state and professional rules dictating appropriate
conduct, as expressed in Wiggins.214
Apart from Frye's proposed minimum standards of professional
conduct, however, trial courts' and prosecutors' inherent discretion in
whether to offer or accept plea deals make it difficult for a reviewing
court both to determine actual prejudice under Strickland2 15 and to
fashion an appropriate remedy that does not intrude on that state
court discretion. The Frye Court, therefore, added the additional
hurdle that "to complete a showing of Strickland prejudice,
defendants who have shown a reasonable probability they would have
accepted the earlier plea offer must also show . . . a reasonable
probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have
prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented." 216 Because
the Supreme Court could not order habeas relief until the defendant
had proven those elements, it instead remanded Frye's case back to
the Missouri Court of Appeals to determine whether Frye suffered
prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland test.217
The principal concern of Justice Scalia's dissent (joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Thomas) was that, despite
the disparate sentencing that resulted from Frye's failure to accept
the earlier-proffered plea because of his attorney's failure to convey it
to him, Frye's conviction was nonetheless correct, per Frye's own
211. Id. at 1408.
212. Id. at 1408-09.
213. "In applying and defining this [reasonable competence] standard substantial
deference must be accorded to counsel's judgment." Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 742
(2011).
214. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).
215. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (observing that "a defendant has no right to be offered a
plea,... nor a federal right that the judge accept it.").
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1411.
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admission of guilt.218 The Frye dissent argued that "[t]he plea-
bargaining process is.. . not ... covered by the Sixth Amendment,
which is concerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the
fairness of conviction."2'
The position of the Frye dissent is somewhat reconcilable with
Padilla's and Hill's insistence that effective assistance of counsel is
crucial to the plea-bargaining stage, because there is some chance that
the rejection of a particular guilty plea might nonetheless result in an
acquittal. Nonetheless, the emphasis that Hill and Padilla place on
the importance of effective plea negotiations suggests that it is a
defense lawyer's duty, not just to help an innocent defendant achieve
an acquittal, but in fact to ensure that all defendants, both innocent
and guilty, receive the most favorable outcome possible under the
circumstances.
ii. Lafler and Incorrect Assessments of a Defendant's Prospects at Trial
Frye spent much of its discussion establishing minimum
standards of performance in the plea-bargaining context and
grounding them in current prevailing professional norms, finally
remanding the case to the state court of appeals to determine actual
prejudice under Strickland.220 In contrast, in Lafler v. Cooper, both
parties stipulated that defense counsel's advice was deficient.22'
Therefore, the Supreme Court's main issue on appeal was how to
determine actual prejudice; the Court also faced the challenge to
fashion appropriate habeas relief where a defendant has relied on the
faulty advice of counsel in deciding to forgo a plea deal. In a rare
occurrence, the Supreme Court held that the Michigan Court of
Appeals' erroneous interpretation of Strickland violated even the
minimal "unreasonable application" standard provided by the
AEDPA,222 thereby (as with Frye) freeing the Supreme Court to
develop new Strickland jurisprudence by expounding upon its
application to this novel question.
Anthony Cooper received several charges in the Michigan trial
court, including assault with intent to murder.223 The prosecution
218. Id. at 1412.
219. Id. at 1413-14.
220. Id. at 1411.
221. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012).
222. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit.
1, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, adding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
223. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
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offered Cooper a plea bargain that involved a guilty plea to two
charges with a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months; Cooper
expressed interest in accepting this deal.m However, Cooper's
defense attorney convinced him that the prosecution could not prove
intent to murder because the victim had been shot below the waist.22
A jury trial convicted Cooper on all counts and sentenced him to up
to thirty years in prison.226
In rejecting Cooper's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the Michigan appellate court held that Cooper's plea decision was
valid because he had made it "knowingly and intelligently." 227 When
Cooper appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, the court held that the appropriate test for
ineffective assistance of counsel was not merely whether a plea
decision was "knowing and intelligent," but additionally whether, as
expressed in Strickland and Hill, counsel's advice was clearly deficient
and whether the defendant was harmed by it.2" This holding offered
the courts of appeal the rare opportunity to review a state court
decision that met the AEDPA's high burden of an unreasonable
application of the Strickland test.229
The Lafler Court established a new rule for defendants who
erroneously forgo plea deals, following the holdings of numerous
United States Courts of Appeals.20 The Court departed from Hill's
requirement that defendants show "a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial."3 1 Instead, the Lafler
Court held that a defendant who forgoes a proffered plea bargain
'must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
reasonable probability . . . the defendant would have accepted the
plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it . . ., [and] that
the court would have accepted its terms."m2 Additionally, in contrast
to the Dominguez Benitez Court's refusal to "second-guess" a
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1383-84,1390.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1384-85.
231. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
232. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384-85. Of course, as in all other "but-for" reversible error
analysis scheme, this requires the defense, and therefore the appellate court as well, to
engage in considerable speculation.
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"foolish" plea decision,233 the Lafler Court held that to show
prejudice, a criminal defendant must show that the "conviction or
sentence, or both, under the [plea] offer's terms would have been less
severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were
imposed."a
The Lafler Court explained that, although "defendants have no
right to be offered a plea[,] . . . nor a federal right that the judge
accept it," even the exercise of discretion must abide by constitutional
limits."' Squarely addressing the Frye dissent's position that
Strickland protects not strict procedural fairness, but only just results,
Justice Kennedy elaborated that "here the question is not the fairness
or reliability of the trial but the fairness and regularity of the
processes that preceded it.""' This holding may express a novel
interpretation of Strickland, in contrast with the previous lax
interpretations that courts have applied in the past to excuse gross
procedural irregularities."' Perhaps the strides the Court made in
Padilla emboldened the Court; it is a welcome step forward.
In contrast with the Frye dissent's contention that because the
end result-a conviction-was the same, a guilty verdict did not
indicate any prejudice against a defendant who would have pleaded
guilty anyway, the Lafler Court opined, "[t]he constitutional rights of
criminal defendants . . . are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike.""' The Court continued, "we decline to hold . . . that the
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel . . . attaches only to
matters affecting the determination of actual guilt. . . . The fact that
respondent is guilty does not mean . .. that he suffered no prejudice
from his attorney's deficient performance during plea bargaining."240
Having established that the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel attaches in the case of foregone plea bargains,
and that a defendant's erroneous decision to go to trial rather than
benefit from the proffered plea bargain was in itself a demonstration
of actual prejudice, the remaining question was that of appropriate
remedy. Because plea bargains are essentially discretionary benefits
233. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85 (2004).
234. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.
235. Id. at 1387.
236. Id. at 1388.
237. See, e.g., Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 76.
238. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
239. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (internal citations omitted).
240. Id.
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that are extended based on the trial court's independent judgment of
the totality of the circumstances, the Lafler Court held that "[t]he
correct remedy ... is to order the State to reoffer the plea agreement.
Presuming respondent accepts the offer, the state trial court can then
exercise its discretion . . . [under] all the circumstances of the case."241
This solution, presumably, eliminates the need for speculation
whether respondent would accept the offer, but it does not cover
situations such as "exploding offers" that are open only for a given
period.242 Nor does it address the fact that, at this later point at the
end of the appellate process, the defendant's knowledge of the "road
not taken" and potential alternative scenarios is much altered from
the defendant's perspective when considering the original offer.243
In dissent, Justice Scalia called Lafler's holding a "judicially
invented right to effective plea bargaining" 24 that "elevates plea
bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement."245
By expanding on the rights previously recognized under Strickland,
Justice Scalia's dissent contended that the majority violated its
responsibility under the AEDPA to preserve all state court decisions
not relying on "unreasonable applications of clearly established
[federal] law."2" Because the gravity of a constructive denial of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is potentially so great, Justice
Scalia's dissent also took issue with the wide discretion the majority
granted to trial courts in fashioning a remedy for such a denial.247
241. Id. at 1391.
242. See, e.g., ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO 112 (Harvard Univ. Press, Mar. 3,
2014).
243. Eric R. Breslin, Ineffective Assistance Claims in Plea Bargains: The Supreme
Court Confronts the Road Not Taken, DUANE MORRIS BLOGS (May 8, 2012, 12:29 PM),
http://blogs.duanemorris.com/duanemorriswhitecollarcriminallawblog/entry/ineffectiveas
sistanceclaimsjin-plea.
244. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1393.
245. Id. at 1397.
246. Id. at 1395-96.
247. Id. at 1397. In his dissent, Justice Scalia noted,
I find it extraordinary that [state] "statutes and rules" can specify the
remedy for a criminal defendant's unconstitutional conviction. Or that
the remedy for an unconstitutional conviction should ever be subject at
all to a trial judge's discretion. Or, finally, that the remedy could ever
include no remedy at all.
Id.
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E. The New Jurisprudence of Plea Bargaining: Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel After Lafler and Frye
As of this writing, several federal district and appellate court
decisions had already distinguished Frye.2  The difficulty in
establishing actual prejudice in a situation so rife with discretion may
make it difficult for defense advocates to argue for the application of
Frye's broader implications in lower courts. Nonetheless, Frye's
narrow holding that defense attorneys are responsible for conveying
written plea offers to their clients249 has already allowed the U.S.
Supreme Court to vacate a state appellate court decision upholding a
criminal conviction and to remand it for further consideration under
Frye.m
It is a testament to the system's thirst for regulation of defense
quality in plea bargaining that federal appellate court decisions and
practitioner bulletins have already begun citing Lafler regularly.251
Courts may find Lafler easier to follow because it tackles the second
prong of the Strickland analysis, as opposed to Frye, which limits itself
to determinations of inadequacy of representation and offers little
guidance as to determinations of prejudice or remedy. As with
Rodriguez v. Oklahoma under Frye, the Supreme Court has vacated
248. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 744 (N.D. Iowa 2012)
(concluding that current ABA guidelines were not binding determinations of minimum
professional standards). See also Villalpando v. United States, C 10-4051-MWB, 2012 WL
1598293, 13 (N.D. Iowa May 7, 2012) (denying defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for failure to oppose prosecution's use of defendant's self-incriminating
statements, while ordering an evidentiary hearing under Frye for counsel's failure to
procure a plea agreement).
249. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). Courts' application of Strickland's
injunction that "strategic choices" such as those inherent in bargaining, "are virtually
unchallengeable," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, and that "evidence about the actual
process of decision . . . should not be considered in the prejudice determination," id. at
694-95, compounds this difficulty.
250. Rodriguez v. Oklahoma, 132 S. Ct. 1792, 1792 (2012).
251. See, e.g., Jay Shapiro, The Supreme Court Requires Effective Assistance of
Counsel in the Plea Bargain Process, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6281, 6281 (Apr. 3, 2012). A
key holding of Lafler and Frye was the Court's
[R]eject[ion of] the argument that a fair trial cleansed the prejudice
caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel. [The Court] did not,
however, offer only one possible remedy. The Court explained that
options involve vacating the trial conviction to allow acceptance of the
original plea offer or the imposition of a sentence consistent with the
original offer. In either respect, the case would have to be remanded
for further proceedings.
Id.
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two Circuit Court decisions and remanded them for reconsideration
applying Lafler.252
Furthermore, in In re Williams, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit held that Lafler did not apply retroactively to those
convictions that became final prior to the decision's issuance.253 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Lafler to
overturn a district court denial of habeas relief in a California state
conviction resulting from an unfavorable plea deal that the defendant
had accepted based on unprofessional and ineffective advice of
counsel.25 4 In United States v. Soto-Lopez, the Ninth Circuit held that
"the correct remedy . . . is to order the [Government] to reoffer the
plea agreement. . . . [T]he [district] court can then exercise its
discretion . . . to vacate the convictions and resentence respondent
pursuant to the plea agreement, to vacate only some of the
convictions . . . , or to leave the convictions and sentence . . .
undisturbed."2" The Fifth Circuit has also approvingly cited Lafler in
ordering further evidentiary hearings to determine actual prejudice
based on ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea-bargaining
context."'
Legal commentators have already begun to dissect Lafler, for
example, to gauge the standards the AEDPA requires reviewing
courts to apply when considering federal habeas corpus petitions."
The gist of these analyses appears to be uncertainty. Lafler, Frye, and
Padilla establish a new kind of Strickland jurisprudence-one that is
based on the practical, everyday realities of the American criminal
justice system, rather than on statutorily enforced jurisprudential
ossification or on idealistic images of the kind of justice that could be
obtained via a "fair trial."258 Lafler and Frye broke the mold of post-
AEDPA rubber-stamping of state court convictions under Strickland
252. See generally Thurmer v. Kerr, 132 S. Ct. 1791 (2012); Thaler v. Arnold, 132 S. Ct.
1790 (2012).
253. In re Williams, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8752, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2012)
(holding that "[p]etitioner cannot rely on Lafler . . . to challenge his conviction and
sentence, because the Supreme Court has not held that Lafler applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review.").
254. United States v. Soto-Lopez, 475 F. App'x 144 (9th Cir. 2012).
255. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,1391 (2012)).
256. United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 678 F.3d 353, 359 (5th Cir. 2012).
257. Donald F. Roeschke, Historical Aspects and Procedural Limitations of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 39 AM. JUR. TRIALS 157, cum. supp. § 7.5 (updated May 2012, originally
published in 1989).
258. "[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials." Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012).
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and, as Justice Alito opined in his dissent to Lafler, "[t]ime will tell
how this works out."259
A recent Supreme Court decision has demonstrated the limits of
Lafler's applicability. In Burt v. Titlow, the Supreme Court
specifically addressed the potential conflict between Lafler and the
AEDPA. There, the Court considered the following issues:
1. Whether the Sixth Circuit failed to give
appropriate deference to a Michigan state court
under AEDPA in holding that defense counsel
was constitutionally ineffective for allowing
Respondent to maintain his claim of innocence.
2. Whether a convicted defendant's subjective
testimony that he would have accepted a plea but
for ineffective assistance, is, standing alone,
sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that defendant would have accepted the plea.
3. Whether Lafler always requires a state trial court
to resentence a defendant who shows a reasonable
probability that he would have accepted a plea
offer but for ineffective assistance, and to do so in
such a way as to "remedy" the violation of the
defendant's constitutional right.26
259. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) quoted in Anthony Franze
& Jeremy McLaughlin, Opinion analysis: Expanding the right to effective counsel during
the plea-bargaining process, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:30 PM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2012/03/opinion-analysis-expanding-the-right-to-effective-counsel-during-
the-plea-bargaining-process/. Franze and McLaughlin explain,
The majority and dissenting opinions in Frye and Lafler are
noteworthy because both sides based their opinions largely on
practical considerations. The majority, which in both cases cited
statistics about the prevalence of plea bargaining in our system, found
Sixth Amendment protection necessary because of the "simple reality"
that our system is largely not one of trials, but one of pleas. For the
dissent, the guiding practical concern was the difficulties that
inevitably will arise given that the majority did not flesh out the legal
standards to use when applying its decisions. The two cases all but
ensure future litigation as lower courts work out the nuances of when
plea advice is constitutionally ineffective, the factors and methods by
which trial courts determine prejudice, and the scope of the remedy.
Id.
260. Burt v. Titlow, 2012 WL 4750282, No. 12-414 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2012), cert. granted,
Burt v. Titlow, 133 S. Ct. 1457 (Feb. 25, 2013)).
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The Supreme Court's final decision in Burt v. Titlow marked a
retreat from the level of guidance on plea bargaining ethics that the
Supreme Court had previously supplied in Lafler and Frye. In Burt v.
Titlow, the Supreme Court clarified that the AEDPA requires federal
courts to exercise a "doubly deferential" standard of review "that
gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the
doubt[.]" 26' The Court clarified that a petitioner for a writ of habeas
corpus must show that the state court's ruling "was so lacking in
justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement."262 The Court held that the Sixth Circuit
below had "failed to apply that doubly deferential standard by
refusing to credit a state court's reasonable factual finding and by
assuming that counsel was ineffective where the record was silent."263
As discussed above, the AEDPA requires defendant appellants to
rebut the state court factual findings "by clear and convincing
evidence," and mandates "a highly deferential standard for reviewing
claims of legal error by the state courts: A writ of habeas corpus may
issue only if the state court's decision 'was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law'[.]"
Burt v. Titlow did offer practical guidance in another common
scenario for appellate courts applying Lafler and Frye. The original
plea bargain that the prosecution had offered defendant Vonlee
Titlow depended on Titlow's testimony against her codefendant.'
The trial court had acquitted Titlow's codefendant, who had since
died, so the prosecution had no incentive to reoffer Titlow her
original plea agreement.2 In her concurrence in the judgment,
Justice Ginsburg cited this practical consideration as overriding the
defendant's concerns over ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea
bargaining stage.267 Ginsburg explained that it would be meaningless
for a federal court to order the state trial court to allow Titlow
261. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388
(2011) (slip op., at 17).
262. Id. at 16 (2013) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011).
263. Id. at 13 (2013).
264. Id. at 15 (2013) (citing The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(e)(1)).
265. Rory Little, Opinion analysis: Court says more about federal habeas review than
ineffective assistance in plea bargaining, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 6, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/opinion-analysis-court-says-more-about-federal-habeas-review
-than-ineffective-assistance-in-plea-bargaining/.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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another opportunity to accept the prosecution's offer, because the
benefit of the prosecution's bargain-Titlow's testimony against her
codefendant-was already lost.268
Nonetheless, the Court found the conduct of Titlow's defense
attorney "troubling," and explained, "a defendant's proclamation of
innocence does not relieve counsel of his normal responsibilities
under Strickland." 269 As Justice Sotomayor's concurrence expanded,
"[r]egardless of whether a defendant asserts her innocence (or admits
her guilt), her counsel must 'make an independent examination of the
facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then . . . offer
his informed opinion as to what pleas should be entered."' 27 0 Justice
Sotomayor explained, "[a] lawyer must 'abide by his client's decision'
but 'only after having provided the client with competent and fully
informed advice, including an analysis of the risks the client would
face in proceeding to trial."' 27' This decision offers crucial guidance to
lower courts as to how the AEDPA limits their authority to remedy
ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining, but also
admonishes practitioners to advise their clients effectively.
F. The Promise and Limits of Judicial Review of Defense Quality
The decisions in Padilla, Lafler, and Frye represented a clear
departure from the prior Supreme Court trend to leave matters of
plea bargaining to ethical regulation and informal mechanisms.
While the Court's willingness to "get real" and acknowledge the
problem is a welcome change, the extent to which judicial review can
actively contribute to an improvement of defense quality in plea
bargaining is hotly debated.
Anthony Rufo, for example, has argued that the AEDPA
dramatically hinders the Supreme Court's ability to remedy
unconstitutional wrongs resulting from ineffective assistance of
counsel; his research suggested that this bind may violate the
Supremacy Clause.272 Published before Lafler and Frye, his note
surveyed decisions of state supreme courts and of the United States
Courts of Appeal, concerning incorrect or inadequate attorney advice
leading to disadvantageous decisions to risk trial and forgo potentially
268. Id.
269. Id. (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013)).
270. Id. (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 19 (2013)).
271. Id. (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 19 (2013)).
272. Anthony E. Rufo, Opportunity Lost?-The Ineffective Assistance Doctrine's
Applicability to Foregone Plea Bargains, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 709, 725 (2009).
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beneficial plea bargains.2 73 He found that, in fact, many circuit courts
already applied the Hill standard to grant habeas relief when such
claims were proven, but that the combination of the AEDPA and
Strickland prevented the Supreme Court from advancing its
jurisprudence in that field to harmonize the circuit split.2 74
In an American Law Reports Article, Kurtis Kemper further
explored the AEDPA's limitations on federal courts' capacity to
grant habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.275
Kemper analyzed several of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in
this Article: Schriro, Premo, and Cronic, among others.2 76  His
research showed how the AEDPA's restrictions have limited the
Supreme Court's right to grant habeas corpus relief and correct
decisions issued by state supreme courts and United States Courts of
Appeal that have erroneously interpreted or applied the
constitutional standards laid out in Strickland.277
Another concern may be that Supreme Court jurisprudence,
even when explicitly focusing on the plea bargaining process and
proclaiming to defend the defendant's right to be properly informed
before trial, cannot appropriately combat other trends in the system
that push clients to plead guilty en masse and punish them for
choosing to go to trial. As Daniel Givelber argues, federal sentencing
guidelines explicitly punish those who choose to go to trial by
sentencing them more harshly than those who accept guilty pleas.278
Similarly, Margaret Etienne illustrates how federal judges at times
use the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to punish the clients of lawyers
273. Id. at 722.
274. Id. at 721-27.
275. Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)-U.S. Supreme Court Cases, 26 A.L.R. F.2d 1 (2008).
276. Id. at § 27.
277. Id.
278. Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility
and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363 (2000). The article illustrates that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines
[A]uthoriz[e] trial judges to find that a defendant's testimony not
credited by the jury constitutes an obstruction of justice. While the
trial court is required to find that the elements of perjury are present,
the judge is authorized to do so ex parte on the basis of the defendant's
trial testimony and the jury's disbelief of it.
Id. at 1368. The Guidelines authorize sentence reductions for "acceptance of
responsibility" and "substantial assistance" to the judicial process (as exemplified by
accepting guilty pleas and testifying against codefendants) and sentence enhancements for
"obstruction of justice" (as exemplified by insistence on going to trial despite evidence of
guilt). Id. at 1371.
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whom the judges regard as "overly" zealous.279 For example, if
attorneys raise every possible claim whether it is meritorious or not,
insist on proceeding to trial despite proof of guilt, or use other
adversarial tactics that judges deem unnecessary, judges may extend
defendants' sentences in response.
Another serious source of concern pertains to the remedy
problem briefly pointed out above: How can one cure, at the
appellate stage, problems that occurred in the plea bargaining stage,
when a (presumably fair) trial has already taken place? This was a
thorny issue in scholarship even before it brought Justices Alito and
Scalia such despair in Lafler and Frye.28 In a note whose publication
preceded Lafler and Frye, David Perez outlined three different forms
of relief that state courts and lower federal courts had traditionally
given to those defendants who appeal their convictions: a new trial,
reinstatement of the plea bargain, and simple affirmation of the
conviction and sentence (finding no actual prejudice, under
Strickland).' Perez argued that ineffective assistance of counsel at
the plea-bargaining phase is not a procedural trial error, but rather a
structural one-similar to the denial of the defendant's right to
represent herself pro se-that poisons the entire process from start to
finish; the only remedy for such a deep constitutional violation, Perez
argued, is a new trial.
Although courts may hesitate to address attorney incompetence
by reversing convictions, several scholars argue that courts should
collaborate more with legislative and regulatory bodies and attorney
279. Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2165 (2003).
Etienne argues that
The overly broad nature of the "acceptance of responsibility"
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines confuses the purpose of the
Guidelines. The two most important factors in determining eligibility
for the acceptance of responsibility adjustment-remorse and
efficiency-are extensively tangled with [judges'] disciplinary concerns
[regarding lawyers] regarding [their] advocacy decisions.
Id.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532 (2011).
282. Id. at 1535.
283. Id. at 1566.
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associations to set and enforce high standards of professionalism.
Even before Lafler and Frye, the Bureau of Justice Assistance was
recommending that state courts work with prosecutors and defense
attorneys to monitor plea bargaining more closely and standardize
case values." In his comment on the recent Supreme Court term,
Stephanos Bibas predicts that, due to the difficulty in applying
judicial assessments of attorney competence to the murky waters of
closed-door plea bargaining sessions, lower courts will overturn very
few convictions in light of Lafler and Frye.' Bibas explains that, as
after Padilla, the primary effects will be "extrajudicial": Legislatures
and professional associations will establish new standards and codes
of conduct to help attorneys meet the competency goals these cases
have set.'
The standards by which the Supreme Court judges claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are in a state of flux. Under
Strickland, a defendant petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus after a
final judgment in state courts must prove both that the advice of
counsel fell below an objectively reasonable standard for minimal
attorney performance, and that, but for the defense counsel's
unprofessional errors, the outcome of the trial would likely have been
different.28 The claimed difference in outcome is not limited to the
difference between an acquittal and a conviction-it can also be a
difference in the harshness of the sentence imposed, a difference in
the plea deal accepted, or another significant outcome at a crucial
stage of trial.8 Strickland itself, for example, addressed defense
counsel's erroneous reliance on the contents of the defendant's plea
colloquy when making his final arguments at the sentencing phase.29
284. For an impassioned argument to establish judicially backed professional norms to
ensure effective assistance of defense counsel in plea bargaining, see Jenny Roberts,
Symposium, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013).
285. The Bureau recommends limiting prosecutorial discretion, involving judges
further in the plea-bargaining process to ensure fairness, and establishing safeguards to
ensure that legal characteristics, such as the severity of the offense, rather than extralegal
characteristics, such as sex and race, determine sentencing risks. Lindsey Devers, Plea and
Charge Bargaining, Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 24, 2011)
available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf.
286. Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126
HARV. L. REV. 150, 174 (2012).
287. Id. at 168-69.
288. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
289. Id. at 674.
290. Id. at 673.
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In Hill and its progeny, the Supreme Court held that Strickland
was satisfied where a defendant could prove that, but for the defense
counsel's inadequate representation, the defendant would likely have
foregone a plea bargain and risked trial.291 The Hill line of cases,
however, did not consider a defendant's subjective assertions that, in
hindsight, he or she regretted a plea deal to be sufficient. Rather, Hill
and its progeny relied on all the facts in the record that were available
to the defendant and counsel at the time they were making their plea
decisions.2" After considering the record, however, the Court would
only analyze what choice the defendant would likely have made,
given the defendant's position at the time of the plea decision, rather
than what the defendant would have preferred later, at the post-
conviction stage.293
As expressed in Harrington v. Richter, the layering of AEDPA
deference upon Strickland deference makes it nearly impossible to
prove that a state court decision relied on objectively unreasonable
applications of federal law and that this reliance caused actual
prejudice.294 Nonetheless, where a few novel questions of
constitutional law have arisen in Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, the
Supreme Court has recently carved out limited exceptions to the
AEDPA restrictions.
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that, as a practical matter,
defense counsel's failure to warn a noncitizen defendant properly
about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea constituted per
se ineffective assistance of counsel, justifying reversal of the
underlying conviction.295 Nonetheless, lower courts have significantly
limited Padilla's applicability by distinguishing the facts and limiting
its applicability in immigration appeals.296 Padilla's applicability to
noncriminal "collateral consequences" outside of the immigration
context, as well as what other constitutional protections it might lend
to immigration proceedings, are still the subjects of continuing
litigation and hot debate.29 The Supreme Court severely curtailed
291. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
292. Id. at 60.
293. Id.
294. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 790 (2011).
295. "[W]hen the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty
to give correct advice is equally clear." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010).
296. See, e.g., Morris v. Holder, 676 F.3d 309, 317 (2d Cir. 2012).
297. See generally Joanna Rosenberg, A Game-Changer? The Impact of Padilla v.
Kentucky on the Collateral Consequences Rule and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407 (2013).
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Padilla's reach in its recent decision, Chaidez v. United States, which
held that the Padilla standard was nonretroactive.29
In Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court expanded the range of
plea-bargaining situations that may serve as grounds for reversal due
to ineffective assistance of counsel. There may be grounds for
reversal where the defendant can show that, but for counsel's failure
to represent the defendant properly at the plea-bargaining phase, the
defendant would likely have accepted a plea deal that would have
been more advantageous than the plea eventually tendered or than
the sentence or conviction eventually given at trial.2 9 Because courts'
sentencing decisions based on plea bargaining are so subjective and
discretionary, however, and because of Strickland's injunction against
considering the idiosyncrasies, emotions, and personal values of
particular judges or juries when reassessing counsel's performance in
hindsight, the question of how to show actual prejudice under Lafler
or Frye is still open to further development through litigation.3
There is a real possibility that appellate courts will abstain from
intervening to correct scenarios they may feel they do not fully
understand.
Where a defendant has received erroneous legal advice and
ineffective assistance of counsel that has influenced him or her to
reject an advantageous plea deal, it is difficult to fashion an adequate
remedy. If the defendant's conviction came about pursuant to an
objectively fair trial, obeying all relevant constitutional protections,
the outcome (a criminal conviction) would be the same whether
arrived at by trial or by plea. Moreover, where the first trial has
resulted in conviction on certain charges and acquittal on others,
ordering a new trial on all the original charges might violate the
Constitution's protection against double jeopardy."0'
Courts must wrestle with the question of the appropriate relief to
grant pursuant to a plea-bargaining violation under Lafler or Frye.
Possibilities include vacation of the original conviction and a grant of
a new trial, a writ of mandamus ordering specific performance of the
original plea deal, refusal to grant any relief at all, or some
compromise among those optionsfo2 Potential compromise solutions
298. Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013).
299. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
300. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984).
301. See generally, e.g., Philip Chinn, Note, A Deal Is a Deal: Plea Bargains and
Double Jeopardy After Ohio v. Johnson, 37 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 285 (2013).
302. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting.)
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could include a sentence adjustment or a mitigation of certain
relevant collateral consequences such as, for example, vacating a
guilty plea to an "aggravated felony" under federal immigration law
in exchange for a new guilty plea to a misdemeanor that did not carry
* 303the same immigration consequence.
The upshot of the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence is that, like the Constitution and the relevant
professional standards themselves, the doctrine is still evolving.
Rather than being frozen in time at 1996, as Harrington's analysis of
the AEDPA would seem to mandate,3 " the federal and state courts
still have room to grow, in coordination with the legal societies and
state courts that dictate the professional standards of conduct that set
the bar for effective assistance of counsel.
HI. Regulating Defense Quality Through Ethical Standards
The American Bar Association and other professional
organizations have published standards that establish best practices
for prosecutors and defense attorneys engaged in plea negotiations.os
On the other hand, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
disciplinary rules in effect in most states do not address ethical duties
in plea bargaining.
The pervasiveness of plea bargaining in the criminal justice
system, coupled with the Model Rules' failure to regulate plea
negotiations, leaves a massive void in the disciplinary regulation of
prosecutors and defense attorneys. This void is particularly peculiar
because defense attorneys are responsible for guarding their clients'
constitutional rights. This task warrants clear guidelines and
standards that a defense attorney must maintain. To the contrary,
ethical duties for defense attorneys in plea bargaining are often
difficult to ascertain and courts seem to only further muddy the water
because of the lack of transparency, information, and a clear record
of occurrences.
303. There is some precedent for judicial intervention to mitigate the adverse
immigration consequences of convictions based on disadvantageous plea deals. See, e.g.,
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001).
304. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-84 (2011).
305. See Part III, Select ABA Standard Excerpts, infra.
306. R. Michael Cassidy, Some Reflections on Ethics and Plea Bargaining: An Essay in
Honor of Fred Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93,96 (2011).
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A. Efforts to Enforce Defense Attorney Duty to Consider Collateral
Consequences
As discussed above, in Padilla the Supreme Court recognized
that defense attorneys should point out collateral consequences to
clients. While the decision was novel in that it changed Supreme
Court doctrine, a strong force in the ethical regulation realm
preceded it. This force strove, and is still striving, to improve the
quality of defense representation in criminal cases, particularly of
indigent clients. Many critics and organizations support enforcing an
ethical duty that would require defense attorneys consider collateral
consequences subject to disciplinary action and/or a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws are concerned with the absence of ethical duties to inform
convicted persons of collateral consequences because of the sheer
number of consequences and the vast variation among jurisdictions.
The Commissioners noted, "[w]hile some disabilities may be well
known, such as disenfranchisement and the firearms prohibition, in
most jurisdictions, no judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, legislator,
or agency staffer could identify all of the statutes that would be
triggered by conviction of the various offenses in the criminal code."0
As a result, the organization proposes states adopt the following
notice for all offenders pleading guilty:
NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES
If you plead guilty or are convicted of an offense you
may suffer additional legal consequences beyond jail
or prison, [probation] [insert jurisdiction's alternative
term for probation], periods of [insert term for post-
incarceration supervision], and fines. These
consequences may include:
* being unable to get or keep some licenses, permits,
or jobs;
* being unable to get or keep benefits such as public
housing or education;
307. Webb v. State, 334 S.W.3d 126, 138-39 (Mo. 2011) (quoting National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Comment to Section 4, Amendments to
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Convictions Act (2010), available at http://www.
uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral-consequences/uccca-final_10.pdf, 11-13.
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* receiving a harsher sentence if you are convicted of
another offense in the future;
* having the government take your property; and
* being unable to vote or possess a firearm.
If you are not a United States citizen, a guilty plea or
conviction may also result in your deportation,
removal, exclusion from admission to the United
States, or denial of citizenship.
The law may provide ways to obtain some relief from
these consequences.'
Their website also tracks the states that have adopted or
introduced the proposed legislation." It notes that North Carolina
enacted the Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act in 201 1.310 A
number of states have introduced the bill in either the House or
Senate, including Wisconsin, Minnesota, Vermont, New Mexico,
Colorado, Nevada, West Virginia, and New York.
In May 2005, another effort to reduce the impact of collateral
consequences developed and centered on providing defense counsel
accessible data for informing their clients of the collateral
consequences of their conviction. One of the primary arguments
against an affirmative duty to inform defendants of collateral
consequences is the complexity of the statutes that impose collateral
consequences and the difficulty accessing the massive amount of
information. Simply put, it is just too hard to know everything. Chief
Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York State Court of Appeals
formed a working group to address this issue. "2 In partnership with
Columbia Law School, the group created a website that collects
academic works, court opinions, and professionals' resources in one
place.31 The law school recently developed and launched a calculator
308. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to
Uniform Collateral Consequences of Convictions Act § 5(a) (2010), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral-consequences/uccca final_10.pdf, 13-14.
309. See generally Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Legislation.aspx.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Collateral Consequences Calculator-New York State, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL, http://calculator.law.columbia.edu/ (last visited May 5, 2014).
313. Id.
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for looking up and comparing collateral consequences of criminal
charges in New York State.3 14 Although this resource is still limited in
its calculations to New York state law and particular subject areas, it
is certainly one step closer to making the duty to inform clients of the
collateral consequences of their convictions an ethical obligation for
defense attorneys.
In a similar effort, the District of Columbia has developed A
Guide for Criminal Defense Lawyers that details the collateral
consequences of criminal charges."'
B. Murky Ethical Guidelines for Defense Attorneys
While various institutions providing ethical guidelines have
addressed the collateral consequences issue, other professional
dilemmas have remained unresolved.
One example is Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which provides that any statement made in the course of an
unsuccessful plea negotiation is not admissible in any proceeding
against the defendant."' Despite this black letter regulation providing
protection to defendants, prosecutors routinely encourage defendants
to "waive the protection of Rule 410 by refusing to engage in plea
discussions without pre-conditional waivers."017  Jeffrey Standen
argues that this departure of clear regulation is a result of growing
prosecutorial power from the enactment of mandatory minimums and
sentencing guidelines, which collectively shifted much of the power to
the prosecutors to rewrite criminal practice.' Not only does the "410
waiver" diminish defendants' protection that the Rule sought to
provide, it also diminishes the role of the defense attorney as an
advocate for the defense by awarding so much control to the
prosecution. This is one example of how mixed messages can
314. Id.
315. Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, Community Re-entry
Program, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in the District of Columbia: A
Guide for Criminal Defense Lawyers (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.txcourts.gov/
pdflConsequencesToCriminalConvictionsDC.pdf.
316. FED. R. EVID. 410 (Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related
Statements).
317. Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, Symposium, "Waiving" Goodbye to
Rights: Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1034 (2011).
318. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF.
L. REv. 1471,1505-06 (1993) (discussing the empowering effect of the sentencing
guidelines for prosecutors in the plea-bargaining process and the resulting drastic changes
to the nature of plea bargaining, and proposing possible solutions).
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complicate defining defense attorneys' duties. The Rule offers
defendants protection-but if defendants routinely waive this
protection in practice, to what degree should the defense attorney
continue to seek the protection?
Moriarty and Main argue that because of the "consistent and
widespread use of plea bargaining, pre-conditional waivers, and
pressures from guidelines and minimum mandatory sentencing, the
role of defense counsel has become both cabined and
marginalized." 319  For instaice, it is well established that defense
attorneys have the legal and ethical obligation to ensure the
defendant fully understands the conditions of a plea agreement and to
offer advice on whether to accept the plea." However, "with the lack
of discovery and the pressure to waive rights, knowing how to counsel
a client is problematic at best."32'
The Padilla Court made another area of defense attorneys'
duties murky by failing to make a clear distinction between direct and
collateral consequences--confusing the attendant obligations of
counsel.322 The Supreme Court pointed to ABA Standards to
measure professional norms, as it also did in Rompilla v. Beard,
holding that defense counsel has a legal obligation to obtain
information that the State has and will use against the defendant.323
The criminal justice system would be healthier if courts and attorneys
consistently met the ABA Standards; however, these legal and ethical
obligations are "difficult to meet in the current climate of limited
319. Moriarty & Main, supra note 317, at 1040.
320. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty, Standard 14-3.2 (3d ed.
1999). See also Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The decision whether
to plead guilty or contest a criminal charge is ordinarily the most important single decision
in any criminal case ... [and] counsel may and must give the client the benefit of counsel's
professional advice on this crucial decision." (quoting ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL
MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1988))); David P. Leonard, Waiver
of Protections Against the Use of Plea Bargains and Plea Bargaining Statements After
Mezzanatto, 23 CRIM. JUST. 8, 13 (2008) (discussing the importance of the role of the
defense attorney in ensuring that the defendant understands any plea offers and enters
any plea agreements knowingly, and noting that "a criminal defendant will rely heavily on
the advice of the defense attorney.").
321. Moriarty & Main, supra note 317, at 1042-43.
322. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-68 (2010).
323. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (Citing the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, the Court remarked: "The notion that defense counsel must obtain
information that the State has and will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of
common sense." Rather, the Standards are "guides to determining what is reasonable.").
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disclosure and pre-conditional waivers."324 Moriarty and Main
succinctly identify the defense dilemma:
The attorney has little time or ability to investigate or
discover what evidence the prosecution has against his
client, is entitled to little discovery, knows the client
risks decades of prison time if she loses at trial (which,
statistically, is overwhelmingly likely to happen), and
yet must advise the client on the best strategy, often
without a sound, fact-based foundation. The dilemma
posed has both constitutional and ethical implications
related to competence.325
These concerns may be particularly pertinent to public defenders
who, especially in the current financial climate, experience
unprecedented heavy caseloads3 26 -reestablishing the "you get what
your pay for" concerns broached by social scientists in the 1960s and
1970s.
The current climate of plea bargaining has ushered a movement
to update the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. Proponents argue
that the system as it stands "is at odds with those ethical and
constitutional requirements," 327 making it necessary to address
particular issues causing systematic ethical dilemmas, including the
issues of investigation, waivers, and prosecutorial disclosure of
evidence pre-plea.
The Proposed Standards require specific proof of knowledge of
guilt before accepting pleas, full disclosure of exculpatory information
before entering plea discussions, and admonitions against routine
waivers of rights and the use of coercive tactics-such as
unreasonably short deadlines. 3' The Standards specifically counsel
324. Moriarty & Main, supra note 317, at 1046.
325. Id.
326. Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders, Bolstered by a Work Analysis and Rulings, Push
Back Against a Tide of Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at A10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/us/public-defenders-turn-to-lawmakers-to-try-to-ease-
caseloads.html.
327. Moriarty & Main, supra note 317, at 1047.
328. Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1113, (2011) (discussing
American Bar Association Proposed Standards for Criminal Justice) [hereinafter
Proposed Standards]; Id. at 1149 (Standard 3-5.7(c)).
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against making false representations, 329 urge prosecutors to remember
the importance of actual innocence in their handling of cases," and
command prosecutors not to engage in discussions with defendants
without either counsel present or counsel's approval to proceed.
New standards indicated that prosecutors should not condition
acceptance of pleas on waiver of all rights, particularly those that
would cause a manifest injustice (actual innocence, newly discovered
evidence, appeal, habeas corpus, and ineffective assistance332) 333
Rory Little, the reporter on the Proposed Standards, commented
that "[w]ith any luck, the current process may end with approving
votes in the House of Delegates sometime in 2013. Until then, it must
be emphasized that the proposed Standards . . . are simply that-
drafts."' The following excerpt is the Proposed Standards for Plea
Discussions and Agreements.
Proposed Standards:335
Standard 3-5.7: Plea Discussions and Agreements
(a) The prosecutor should remain open to discussions
with defense counsel concerning disposition of
charges by guilty plea or other negotiated
disposition. A prosecutor should not engage in
plea discussions directly with a represented
defendant, except with defense counsel's
approval. Where a defendant has properly
waived counsel, the prosecutor may engage in
plea discussions with the defendant, and should
make and preserve a record of such discussions.
(b) The prosecutor should not enter into a plea
agreement before having information sufficient to
assess the defendant's actual culpability. The
prosecutor should consider collateral
consequences of a conviction before entering into
a plea agreement. The prosecutor should not be
329. Id. at 3-5.7(d).
330. Id. at 3-5.7(f).
331. Id. at 3-5.7(a).
332. Id. at 1150 (Standard 3-5.9).
333. Moriarty & Main, supra note 317, at 1048-49.
334. Proposed Standards, supra note 328, at 1113.
335. Id. at 1148-49.
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influenced in plea discussions by inappropriate
factors such as those listed in Standard 3-4.5(b)
above.
(c) The prosecutor should not set unreasonably short
deadlines, or conditions for a plea that are so
coercive that voluntariness of the plea or
effectiveness of defense counsel is put into
question. A prosecutor may, however, set a
reasonable deadline before trial or hearing for
acceptance of a plea offer.
(d) The prosecutor's duty of candor (Section 3-1.3
above) applies in plea discussions. A prosecutor
should not knowingly make false statements or
misrepresentations of fact or law in the course of
plea discussions.
(e) Prior to entering into a plea agreement, the
prosecutor should disclose to the defense a factual
basis sufficient to support the charges in the
proposed plea agreement, and information
currently known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate guilt, mitigates the offense or is likely to
reduce punishment.
(f) A prosecutor should not routinely require waivers
of the disclosures in (e) above, but may on an
individualized basis seek and accept a knowing
and voluntary waiver. Before accepting a guilty
plea, however, the prosecutor should always
disclose evidence known to the prosecutor that
directly suggests the defendant is innocent. A
prosecutor may not accept a guilty plea if the
prosecutor reasonably believes that sufficient
admissible evidence to support conviction beyond
reasonable doubt is lacking.
Notably, the quoted standards address prosecutorial duties rather
than defense duties. The assumption seems to be that defense
attorneys will be disinclined to proffer inconsistent pleas and do not
require a special ethical standard to instruct them on that matter.
As this standard and the rest of this chapter demonstrate, while
the issue of notification of collateral consequences had been dealt
with via ethical rules prior to the Padilla decision, other aspects of
plea negotiation are not adequately addressed by ethical rules.
834 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:4
Defense attorneys seeking clarity on professionalism will not find it in
rules and Supreme Court decisions, but rather in developing
professional expertise on their own.
IV. Regulating Nuances: Expertise and Hope
While Lafler, Frye, and their progeny delved deeper into
regulating defense attorney ethics in plea bargaining, various voices,
described above, have urged more clarity in such ethical rules. These
movements may give rise to changes in ABA rules. However, some
gray areas present special difficulties in regulation. Those areas
pertain to the major concerns raised by empirical literature with
regard to defense attorney function-the way in which defense
attorneys develop the necessary expertise to assess the "value of the
case," and the appropriate way to present the plea and trial prognosis
to the client-balancing realism and hope. We now turn to address
these gaps.
A. Expertise: Training Defense Attorneys in Plea Bargaining
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice require programs be
established to train both beginning and advanced practitioners. It
notes that entry-level training programs in public defender offices are
particularly important to ensure effective representation."' For the
purpose of this Article, the authors sought such programs and failed
to find them. Moreover, an informal, anecdotal survey of entry-level
indigent defense attorneys revealed that such programs were
unavailable, and that they tended to gain expertise in assessing the
"value of the case" by "learning on the job." Many young attorneys
rely on feedback from more experienced colleagues:
My experience is basically that crimes like DUIs
have very set offer ranges based on BAC, but most
things are just what DA you get. My offer fielding is
just a personal gut check and then panicking and
asking my colleagues if I just screwed my client.
Literally every attorney in this office is more senior
than I am, but I usually ask the most senior one here if
I'm really worried. Plea bargaining is all about
336. American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Section Standards, Standard 5-1.5:
Training and professional development, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal
justice section archive/crimiust_standardsdefscsblk.html#1.2.
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institutionalized knowledge, and there's not much
formal training, as far as I can tell.
It is really the position of our office that there is
no one right way, just be true to the kind of attorney
you are. In keeping with that, part of our training was
to follow other attorneys around and watch and get a
sense of what would work for you and what wouldn't.
That is to learn about every aspect of practice but ends
up being a lot about plea bargaining because we do so
much of that.
We all talk to each about what cases are worth
and what we think we should get for them (literally all
the time: what is too high so go to trial, what is really
low and the person should probably take it and run
(unless it's crazy low so maybe something is going on
with the case on the DA's side that we don't know
about). We do a huge amount of round tabling at
lunch and at meetings. The head of branch offices in
OC periodically ask what averages are for certain
charges to compare with one another, probably in an
attempt to promote some kind of continuity."'
It all seems very second nature at this point, but I
do remember being scared and alone and running
EVERYTHING by someone who had been here
longer before I signed the paperwork. I learned
everything by watching and asking, either officially in
training or by being in court.338
I received some in-house training where a senior
attorney reviewed standard sentencing guidelines and
listed one or two alternative sentences or charge
reductions commonly used.
In terms of my experience with plea bargaining, I
had the guidelines and my notes from the training as a
337. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Private Indigent Defense Attorney,
Alameda County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
338. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Assistant Public Defender, Orange
County, Calif. (Sept. 2, 2013).
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foundation. I was then thrown into the deep end and
had to feel things out for myself; I'd randomly ask
another PD for their second opinion after I had
negotiated an offer, but I was pretty much on my own
after the training. I spent a lot of time asking for
second opinions, but after a while, the training wheels
were expected to come off, and I had to navigate plea
339bargains on my own.
In my limited experience I have never had official
trainings for plea bargaining. I simply seek advice
from more seasoned attorneys. In Sacramento though
we do have "standard offers" sheets. We are
discouraged from taking anything worse than a
standard offer. If we can't bargain for something
better than a standard offer we're encouraged to set
for trial.'
In some cases, the prosecutorial offers are inflexible-
"supermarket" rather than "bazaar" style-in which case, defense
attorneys had little leeway anyway:
Some charges have a universally acknowledged
"standard offer." I know what everyone will get on a
first DUI without talking to a DA about it because the
DA's office has decided what it is and they don't
deviate for anything: plead out at arraignments/
pretrials/day of trial or your sentence after a
conviction at trial; it never changes14
The most important thing is knowing what a case
is worth. That comes with experience and doing it and
f***ing up. Most of the time, I'm trying to get a case
to settle for what it is worth. For example, in our
county a second-time drug based DUI will always be
339. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Assistant Public Defender, San Diego
County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
340. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Assistant Public Defender,
Sacramento County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
341. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Assistant Public Defender, Orange
County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
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offered formal probation and 45 days. Generally, [the
DA's] job is to offer the standard and my job is to
determine-by examining the facts-whether I can
sweeten the standard, or the standard is a really good
deal, or whatever. Sometimes it's worth it to get the
judge involved-the judge can make an offer to plead
to all charges, and can pressure the DA into making a
more reasonable offer, although in this county half the
judges were former DAs.32
Interviewees regarded the continuing legal education programs
that the ABA required as scant and unhelpful:
I think I have seen one MCLE class on plea
bargaining since I started paying attention to them and
it was mixed in with other things as well. The OC
PD's Office had a three-week in-house training when I
started and it covered various topics; one training was
on plea bargaining and it largely centered around the
idea that everyone has their own style. And that is
routinely what I have been told by other attorneys
since I got here.343
There was/is no "plea bargaining" training and no
you don't really go to other attorneys to seek their
input on offers .... The lawyer has to know based on
experience, individual personalities and jurisdictional
practice how/what to weigh and when.344
As for [continuing legal education] for plea
bargains, I think they have them, but they don't teach
you much-like most CLEs. You can have one person
doing a seminar about how to play tough, and one
person doing a seminar about how to be nice, and
342. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Indigent Defense Attorney, Placer
County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
343. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Private Indigent Defense Attorney,
Alameda County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
344. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Assistant Public Defender, Maryland
(Sept. 3, 2013).
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neither one will be particularly useful-a tough person
can't really be nice effectively, and vice versa.""
Given the lack of guidance available to defense attorneys, one
way to improve would be to compile information within the public
defender's office about "going rates" for different offenses, to give
attorneys an indication as to the sentencing ballpark. CLE programs
could offer role-playing exercises and mock cases to assess evidence
strength, thus complementing the inevitable "learning on the job" by
attorneys.
An effort at providing "best practices" should, in our opinion,
include the following components:
(1) An effort by the defense bar to compile
"standard offers" for various types of offenses;
(2) A checklist to help inexperienced defense
attorneys assess the value of the case, including:
a. the strength of each piece of evidence
b. the overall strength of the case
c. Predictions and expectations pertaining to
the particular county, judge, and jury pool;
(3) The client's personal situation, relationships,
and plans for the future;
(4) The possible collateral consequences of the
plea;
(5) The possible collateral consequences of
conviction that may be avoided with future
negotiation; and
(6) The ability to negotiate with the prosecution
and obtain a better plea.
B. Hope: Describing the Trial and Plea Prognosis to the Client
Another gray area that would be nearly impossible to regulate is
the way in which the attorney presents the plea offer to the client.
Naturally, a preference for trial or for a plea would differ based on
the facts of each individual case, and the defense attorney's
assessment of the value of the case and desirability of the plea is
essential. But to what extent may the lawyer persuade the client to
take a plea or go to trial? And where should a defense attorney
345. Telephone Interview by Deanna Dyer with Indigent Defense Attorney, Placer
County, Calif. (Sept. 3, 2013).
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situate himself on the continuum between loose, passive advising, as
found in Flemming's ethnography," and the impermissible "conning"
identified by Blumberg?347 Part of the answer may lie in sensitivity to
the balance between fostering realism and cultivating hope in clients.
In Law in the Cultivation of Hope, Kathryn Abrams and Hila
Keren argue that the law can empower individuals and institutions
through cultivating positive emotions, such as forgiveness or trust.348
The authors identify five stages that an individual goes through
before successfully becoming "hopeful." First, the individual must
become a "subject of hope": one that may possibly become hopeful.m9
Second, the subject must "embrace particular hopes" by perceiving a
distant but valuable goal and view the goal as one that she can
potentially achieve.o Third, the subject should "identify a means to
an end," which requires the hoper to imagine a range of possibilities
and remain open to unfamiliar strategies."' Fourth, the hoper must
gain the support of others and draw on their psychological assistance
to achieve her objectives.352 Finally, the subject should move on from
"particular hopes to hopefulness . . . . [A] deep inclination toward
aspiration and pragmatic self-assertion that hopefulness entails helps
those who acquire it to surmount specific obstacles and recover from
unavoidable disappointments."3 3 Abrams and Keren then identify
five elements that are central to the effort to cultivate hope in others:
"communicating recognition and vision; introducing an activity that
allows for individuation; providing resources; supporting agency; and
fostering solidarity."354
Notably, Abrams and Keren mention two potential perils of
cultivated hope: disappointment and reinforcing "otherness." A
defense attorney who seeks to "cultivate hope" in a client runs these
risks, particularly in the pretrial phase when hope for a positive
outcome remains. If a person who at first feels hope experiences an
eventual disappointment, her quality of life may decrease; her belief
346. Flemming, supra note 68.
347. Blumberg, supra note 39.
348. Kathryn R. Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 319 (2007).
349. Id. at 330.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 331.
352. Id. at 333.
353. Id. at 335-36.
354. Id. at 323.
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that active involvement in an activity or project would provide an
opportunity for her to live a better life may exacerbate the despair
she feels if this opportunity does not blossom."'
The second potential peril derives from the danger of patronizing
the prospective hopers and enhancing their marginalization or
"otherness":
The same power inequalities that enable the
cultivation of hope [the attorney-client relationship
within the criminal law context] may also carry
detrimental potential-patronizing the prospective
hopers and enhancing their marginalization or
otherness. Individuals who foster hope, even with
good intentions, may objectify and perpetuate the
stigmatization of their beneficiaries.
In that manner, the manipulation of hope serves the purpose of the
cultivator rather than that of the beneficiaries.
When communicating an offer to the client, the defense attorney
may need to provide information on which path offers more hope:
trial or a plea bargain. In addition to providing a realistic assessment
of odds of conviction and information about sentencing, defense
attorneys should consider offering the message in a way that opens up
a path of hope and redemption for the client after the process is over.
This is not always an easy balance to maintain. For example, it is not
always possible to offer a detailed prognosis of a client's likely
sentence after a plea deal, versus after trial. If an attorney feels
pressure to provide specific risk estimates that later prove false after
trial, this could lead to serious disappointment. On the other hand,
the tendency, identified in Flemming's ethnography, to allow
defendants to take more responsibility for their decisions, may also
lead to disappointment and disillusionment, as well as to a feeling that
the attorney "did not do her job" in guiding the client.
Issues to consider when constructing a "best practices" list for
defense attorneys communicating with their clients include:
(1) Making sure that the client-whether guilty or
not-finds a guilty plea compatible with his/her
sense of justice and with the feeling that he/she
has received his/her day in court;
355. Id. at 336.
356. Id. at 358.
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(2) Emphasizing that the client is the ultimate
decider of his/her own fate;
(3) Ensuring that the client understands not only
the realistic implications of the choice, but also
that his/her life is not over regardless of what
the options are; and
(4) Beginning to provide information on how to
better the client's life post-conviction (planning
for rehabilitation and reentry, petitioning for
removal of collateral consequences when
applicable, discussing the need to mend
relationships and obtain support for one's
choice).
While the cultivation of hope is not something that Supreme
Court cases or ethical standards can regulate, it is imperative to keep
in mind that clients are, first and foremost, human beings, with
futures ahead of them. Making an informed decision about the
future, therefore, also requires thinking about the proactive steps that
will follow the conviction. The legal entanglement is only one aspect
of a richly lived human life, and while the defense attorney's expertise
is mostly in the legal realm, a holistic consideration of the client's
options and prospects is invaluable.
Conclusion
The recent Supreme Court decisions on defense counsel duties
do not present clear-cut rules for attorneys and courts to follow when
fashioning a "jurisprudence of plea bargaining" to reflect the realities
of our current plea-dependent justice system. However, the impact of
these cases is nonetheless profound. The acknowledgment by the
Court's majority that plea bargaining is, in fact, how courts process
the vast majority of cases mandates attention to the skills and duties
that plea bargaining requires.
Defense attorneys cannot solely rely on the Court to establish
clear expectations and ethical boundaries when handling plea
bargains, but they can use the Court's recent holdings to advocate for
the development of solid plea bargaining ethical standards. Lafler,
Padilla, and Frye addressed extreme cases of ineffective assistance of
counsel. However, they have also provided the foundation and
momentum necessary to shed light on the current void in defense
attorney training for plea bargaining ethics and technique.
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The emerging jurisprudence of plea bargaining has the promise
to create space to develop ethical standards that will have a
widespread impact on defense attorneys' everyday practices. To fill
this void, regulatory bodies and professional associations should
create "best practices" and specific, case-based training to foster
sensitivity and sophistication both in assessing the values of plea
bargains and in communicating them properly to clients.
Much of the past century's ethnographic research on the criminal
justice system has tended to view criminal adjudication as a set of
shifting balance points in the interplay between "crime control" and
"due process." Sentencing norms seem to arise from social forces
that complement each other just as much as they conflict with each
other, which reach far beyond the individual facts of cases, or the
personal characteristics and desires of defendants and victims. The
ratio of caseload to courtrooms; public perceptions of crime,
rehabilitation, and punishment; prosecution and defense capacity;
courtroom working group cohesion; available correctional funding;
and many more interests all push and pull at each other.
The individual defendant may feel like a figure on a wire mobile
sculpture, dangling in these shifting winds. A defendant may remain
in detention, pending the outcome of a long and confusing trial;
public funding may be inadequate for a zealous defense; or a judge
may feel pressure to clear the docket by disposing of criminal cases
quickly. Faced with these strong incentives to plead guilty, a criminal
defendant may feel the system is conspiring to take away his or her
choices.
Under these precarious conditions, defense attorneys must
remember their clients' autonomy, agency, and long-term needs.
Although attorneys must act in what they consider their clients' best
interest, the client himself or herself must make the ultimate decision
of whether to go to trial. If a client decides to pursue a plea bargain,
the defense attorney is responsible to secure the best deal possible.
There are many ways to do this, but basic responsibilities should
include obtaining information in advance that the prosecutor might
use at trial, presenting a frank and accurate assessment of the case-
including the potential long-term and collateral consequences of any
criminal conviction, regardless of the sentence-and insisting on
procedural and substantive fairness from all involved.
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